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Abstract 
Evidence has been accumulated to suggest that cognitive biases in reasoning and 
information processing would play an important role in the mechanism of delusions 
(Bentall, 1994; Garety & Hemsley, 1994). Bentall and his colleagues further argue that 
abnormal cognitive biases would reflect a defensive furiction in people with delusions; 
deluded individuals would have much in common with depressives and their defensive 
function may serve to protect themselves against underlying low self-esteem. Therefore, it 
was assumed that when the defensive function can be bypassed, deluded individuals would 
be seen similar to depressives. The aim of the present research was to investigate the 
proposed defensive mechanism in deluded individuals and to assess a new potential 
methodology for the investigation of the defensive mechanism. It was suggested that the 
emotional priming paradigm would be a promising approach, and this was used in addition 
to a questionnaire-based approach. 
The results of the present research partly supported the hypothesis of the defensive 
mechanism in deluded patients. On an implicit questionnaire which is supposed to bypass 
the defensive function, the deluded subjects showed more internal attributions for negative 
events than did the normal subjects (Experiment 1). In the emotional priming task, the 
deluded subjects were slower to reject negative adjectives than the normal subjects 
(Experiment 2). However, the other results appeared to be unclear in their support for the 
hypothesis, thus further research should be required. The emotional priming paradigm was 
then carefully examined in a student population (Experiment 3). The results of this study 
indicated that the emotional priming paradigm was indeed a potential methodology, but 
also suggested that further refinements for clinical use are needed. 
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A Brief Outline of the Thesis 
Although a considerable number of cognitive and social models for normal beliefs 
have been proposed, it is surprising that until recendy little research on abnormal beliefs 
have been carried out by experimental psychopathologists (Winters & Neale, 1983). Bentall 
(1994) suggested two possible reasons for the failure to develop models of abnormal beliefs 
with the findings gained from normal psychology: first, simply because of a general failure 
of communication between psychologists and psychopathologists; second, because of 
psychopathologists' long-held preference for investigating broadly defined syndromes 
rather than studying particular psychopathological phenomena. In recent years, however, a 
number of researchers have advocated the study of particular symptoms of madness, such 
as "delusion" rather than the study of hypothetical syndromes, such as "schizophrenia", 
either because there has remained doubts about the scientific validity of the traditional 
diagnoses for psychosis (Bentall, 1993; Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988), or because the 
symptoms per se are interesting research topic (Persons, 1986). 
Recently, the attempt to explain the nature and mechanism of abnormal beliefs such 
as delusions has been one of the most interesting challenges to social and cognitive 
psychologists. Actually, psychological literature on explanations of abnormal beliefs can be 
divided into two broad approaches. First, some investigators following Maher's suggestion 
(1974) have proposed that delusions are the product of a rational attempt to interpret 
abnormal experiences, and that the perceptions of deluded patients are anomalous but their 
reasoning processes are almost always normal. On the other hand, the second type of 
explanations has focused on "cognitive biases" in reasoning and information processing, 
which are thought to play an important role in the aetiology and the maintenance of 
abnormal beliefs (e.g., Bentall, 1994; Brennan & Hemsley, 1984; Hemsley & Garety, 1986; 
Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988). Although there have been reports that some delusions are 
related to abnormal perceptions (Maher & Ross, 1984), it is clear that delusions often 
develop without either abnormal experiences or perceptual anomaly (Chapman & 
Chapman, 1988). 
Despite the comparatively small amount of empirical research on this area, findings 
have been accumulated to suggest that people with delusions exhibit certain cognitive 
biases in reasoning and information processing and these cognitive biases would play an 
important role in the nature and the holding of delusional beliefs (Bentall, 1994; Garety & 
Hemsley, 1994). In particular, Benatall and his colleagues have focused on the social 
reasoning processes in patients with delusions, because many delusions expressed by 
patients in clinics tend to concern themes that reflect the patients' position in the social 
environment. Using the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ: Peterson, Semmel, von 
Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982), the work of Bentall and his colleges 
(e.g., Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Bentall, Kaney & Dewey, 1991) showed that patients with 
delusions have attributional biases in which they attribute negative outcomes to stable and 
global causes as do depressed patients, but unlike depressed patients, they make 
attributions for negative outcomes external to themselves. This pattern of external 
attributions for negative events is seen in healthy individuals who attribute negative 
outcomes to external causes and positive outcomes to themselves. This is regarded as "self-
serving bias" to maintain self-esteem (more details of "self-serving bias" is given in Chapter 
1). Kaney & Bentall (1992) found that the deluded patients also had a self-serving bias on 
the estimates of their control on computer games: the deluded patients reported more 
control in the win conditions than in the lose conditions, which was also found in normal 
subjects although in a moderate way. 
The findings of these cognitive biases can be interpreted to suggest that people 
suffering from delusions would have a general cognitive style which is associated with 
delusions. Bentall and his colleagues have suggested that patients with delusions would 
have low self-esteem like depressives, however, unlike depressed patients, deluded 
individuals need to protect themselves from chronic feelings of low self-esteem. Therefore, 
cognitive biases exhibited by deluded patients would be the product of their general 
cognitive style activated by the need to defend themselves against negative feelings about 
the self. This cognitive mechanism in patients with delusions can be regarded as "defensive 
function", in order to defend deluded individuals against underlying low self-esteem (e.g., 
Bentall, 1994; Lyon, Kaney & Bentall, 1994). This suggestion parallels the hypothesis that 
paranoia could be a defence against low self-esteem, therefore, might be regarded as a form 
of camouflaged depression (Zigler & Glick, 1988). 
Lyon, et al. (1994) directly investigated the defensive mechanism in people with 
delusions by using two different types of questionnaires, ASQ and PIT (The pragmatic 
Inference Test: Winters & Neale, 1985). The ASQ directly asks subjects to give major 
causes of the hypothetical negative/positive situations involving subjects, and then to judge 
the causes in terms of intemality, stability and globality. Thus, the ASQ requires subjects to 
make expUcit judgements of causes of hypothetical situations involving themselves, which 
would activate defensive function in deluded patients. Conversely, the PIT asks such 
judgements implicitly, because it is presented as a memory test. Therefore, on the PIT, the 
defensive mechanism could be bypassed. Lyon, et al. (1994) found that the deluded patients 
showed a dramatic transition in style from a self-defensive bias on the ASQ to a self-
blaming bias on the PIT, and concluded that these biases indicate the defensive attributional 
style in the deluded patients (more details of this study is presented in Chapter 1). 
This thesis reports an examination of the defensive function in people with 
delusions following the arguments of Bentall and his colleagues. The defensive function 
will be investigated by two different approaches. Firstly, adapting the procedure used by 
Lyon, et al. (1994), the ASQ and the PIT were chosen to use and the comparisons of the 
responses between these questionnaires will be examined. Secondly, a new experimental 
task will be carried out. This is "the emotional priming paradigm" which potentially would 
reflect both explicit and implicit judgmental processes on a self-evaluating task (extending 
the emotional priming paradigm to this area of research will be discussed in Chapter 1). As 
mentioned above, little experimental research has been carried out in this area of research, 
therefore, an attempt to apply the emotional priming paradigm should be valuable. 
In this section, a brief outline of the arguments in this thesis have been presented. 
Chapter 1 presents these arguments more fully along with a selective review of recent 
research on cognitive biases in deluded patients. In addition, the emotional priming 
paradigm to use for this research will be considered in Chapter 1. Then, in the following 
chapters, the questionnaire-based study and the experimental study for investigating the 
defensive function will be presented. 
Chapter 1 Cognitive Biases in People with Delusions and The Emotional Priming 
Paradigm 
1.1 Overview 
In recent years, research on abnormal beliefs has received increasing attention from 
psychologists, and researchers have advocated the investigation of cognitive processes 
involved in abnormal beliefs such as delusions (e.g., Hemsley & Garety, 1986; Kaney & 
Bentall, 1989; Bentall, et al., 1991; Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991). Evidence has 
accumulated to suggest that the nature and the mechanism of delusions may be explained 
by cognitive biases (e.g., Bentall, 1994; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Dudley, 1996). 
This chapter will present a selective review, following the arguments that cognitive 
biases in reasoning and information processing play an important role in the formation and 
maintenance of delusions. In particular it will focus on the arguments of Bentall and his 
colleagues. There is a relative lack of empirical studies in this area of research and it would 
benefit from new potential experimental approaches. In this chapter, "the emotional 
priming paradigm" will be considered as one such possible methodology. 
1.2 Cognitive biases in people with delusions 
1.2.1 Social reasoning biases 
Bentall (1994) cautioned against dismissing delusions as completely meaningless. 
When studying cognitive abnormalities in patients suffering from delusions, their abnormal 
beliefs encountered in psychiatric chnics should be focused on. In fact, delusions tend to 
concern certain themes, particularly those related to the patients' positions in e social 
interactions (Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Bentall, 1994; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994, 
etc.). For this reason, Bentall and his colleagues have chosen Social Attributional Theory 
which provides a framework for understanding the explanations that individuals give for 
their own behaviour and the behaviour of other people. Depression has also been studied 
from the viewpoint of attributional theory (e.g., Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; 
Peterson & Seligman, 1984), and it has been suggested that depressed patients given the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ: Peterson, et al., 1982) have a specific attributional 
style, making internal, global and stable attributions for negative social events involving 
themselves. 
The first attempt to apply Social Attribution Theory to delusions was the study of 
Kaney & Bentall (1989). Based on the findings in depression, Kaney & Bentall (1989) 
predicted that patients suffering from delusions would also have a particular attributional 
style. This would be characterised by stable and global attributions for negative events like 
depressives, but unlike depressives these patients would have external rather internal 
attributions for negative events. The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ: Peterson, et 
al., 1982) was given to the patients with persecutory delusions, depressives as psychiatric 
controls and normal subjects. The ASQ requires subject to think of possible causes for 
positive and negative events, and then to self-rate these causes on bipolar scales of 
intemality, stability and globality. As predicted, the deluded subjects showed a particular 
attributional style similar to depressives, making stable and global attributions for negative 
events. However, in contrast to the depressives, they made abnormally external attributions 
for negative events. This finding was substantially replicated by Candido & Romney 
(1990). 
Attributional analysis on delusions has been expanded in several ways. For example, 
Kinderman, Kaney, Morley and Bentall (1992) did further attributional analyses on the data 
of Kaney & Bentall (1989), together with new data from a further series of patients. 
Kinderman et al. (1992) asked five independent judges to bUndly rate the subjects' actual 
causal explanations in terms of intemality. These judges' ratings of intemality were 
compared with the self-ratings by the subjects. It was found that the judges' ratings of 
intemality on the subjects' actual explanations were relatively even-handed for both 
positive and negative events for all three groups of subjects (deluded, depressed and 
norinal). However, the self-ratings by the deluded subjects showed that they gave more 
intemal self-ratings of their attributions for positive events than for negative events, as did 
the normal subjects to a lesser degree. The depressed subjects' self-ratings were again 
even-handed like the judges' ones. Kinderman et al. (1992) suggested that "...the deluded 
subjects had a particular tendency to bias their ratings of their own explanations of negative 
events towards the external and away from the internal (p.379)". 
Bentall et al. (1991) investigated the deluded subjects' explanations for the 
behaviour of others in social interactions. Bentall et al. (1991) found that the deluded 
subjects, compared with the depressed and normal subjects, had a significant bias towards 
attributing negatively-valued actions to the actor rather than circumstances and the victim. 
This result seems to parallel the eariier findings of Kaney & Bentall (1989) that the deluded 
subjects were found to be unwilling to make attributions to themselves for negative social 
events in which they were the victims. In the study of Bentall et al. (1991), even when it is 
not the case that the deluded patients were victims, they were also unwilling to blame other 
victims. These findings suggest that the social reasoning of deluded patients could have a 
protective function (Bentall, et al., 1991). 
1.2.2 Self-serving bias 
Considering the previous findings obtained from attributional analyses, abnormal 
beliefs of deluded patients can be accounted for by assuming that they have an extreme 
form of "self-serving bias" (Kaney & Bentall, 1992; Kinderman, et al., 1992; Lyon, et al., 
1994; Bentall, 1994). "Self-serving bias" has been termed by social psychologists, the 
tendency, widely observed in normal individuals, to attribute positive outcomes to self and 
negative outcomes to external circumstances to maintain self-esteem (Hewstone, 1989). 
Kaney & Bentall (1992) directiy tested this hypothesis by adapting the previous 
procedure of Alloy & Abramson (1979). The subjects were asked to estimate to what 
degree they believed they had control over winning or losing points on two computer 
games. Unknown to the subjects, the games were pre-programmed to yield "win" or "lose" 
outcomes. As predicted, the deluded subjects exhibited strong self-serving bias on their 
estimates of control, that is, they reported much more control when gaining points than 
when losing points. This bias was also found in the normal subjects but in a moderate way. 
It was absent in the depressives who were more reahstic and claimed littie control in both 
win and lose conditions as had been found by Alloy & Abramson (1979). 
Bentall et al. (1994) derived a self-concept model from Higgins (1987) in order to 
understand the self-serving bias. Bentall et al. (1994) proposed that people with delusions 
may have discrepancies between their perceptions of aspects of themselves. Depression was 
thought to reflect the discrepancy between actual-self and ideal-self (Scotte & O'Hara, 
1993, cited in Bentall, et al., 1994). In addition, anxiety was found to be associated with 
actual-self/ought-self discrepancies (Scotte & O'Hara, 1993, cited in Bentall, et al., 1994). 
Bentall et al. (1994) suggested that persecutory delusions may result from an attempt to 
reduce the actual-self/ideal-self discrepancies at the expense of perceiving others as having 
a negative view of themselves. It was further proposed that the self-serving bias would 
reflect and maintain such cognitive abnormalities. On this view, Bentall et al. (1994) 
predicted that self-serving or self-protective bias would be absent when the self 
discrepancies are not directiy activated. 
1.2.3 Other cognitive biases 
These findings mentioned above may imply the possibility that people suffering 
from delusions have a fragile self-concept and cognitive abnormalities in information 
processing (Kinderman, 1994). Bentall & Kaney (1989) used the emotional Stroop test in 
order to address this argument more directiy. A form of emotional Stroop test was given 
to the deluded, depressed and normal subjects, which required the subjects to name the ink 
colours of paranoid words, depressive words, neutral words and meaningless strings of Os. 
Bentall & Kaney (1989) found that the deluded subjects took significantiy longer to colour-
name the paranoid words than the controls, showing that they were unable to avoid 
attending to the meaning of those words. In another study using the emotional Stroop 
paradigm (Kinderman, 1994), the deluded subjects demonstrated slowed colour-naming for 
both the positive and negative adjectives, although to a greater extent for the negative 
words. The deluded subjects rated negative trait adjectives as less self-descriptive when 
they were required to judge those adjectives as self-descriptive or not. It was concluded 
that deluded patients have an attentional bias towards information related to the self-
concept and incompatibility between interference and word ratings could reflect a self-
defensive process in deluded patients. 
Another type of research on information processing biases is investigation of recall 
bias. Kaney, Wolfenden, Dewey & Bentall (1992) required the deluded, depressed and 
normal subjects to recall stories which were either threat-related or non threat-related. It 
was found that the deluded subjects preferentially recalled threat-related material. This 
finding parallels the results of Bentall & Kaney (1989) where the deluded subjects showed 
ane attentional bias towards threat-related words. In a more recent study, Bentall, Kaney & 
Bowen-Jones (1995) employed a mixed Ust of words (threat-related, depressed-related and 
emotionally neutral words) which were given to the patients suffering from persecutory 
delusions, depressed controls, and normal subjects. The subjects were required to recall the 
words on the list immediately afterwards. It was found that the deluded subjects recalled 
fewer words overall than the normal subjects, and that there was a recall bias towards both 
threat-related and depressed related words in the deluded subjects but only towards 
depressed-related words in the depressed subjects. It was also found that the deluded 
subjects showed a significant tendency to repeat threat-related words compared to either 
depressed-related or neutral words. 
These findings may suggest that deluded individuals have selective information 
processing biases towards threatening information in their attention and memory (Bentall, 
1994), and that these biases could reflect a defensive process in deluded patients 
(Kinderman, 1994). 
1.2.4 Defensive function 
These cognitive biases in reasoning and information processing in people with 
delusions can be interpreted as deluded individuals having, in an exaggerated form 
compared with normal individuals, cognitive biases particularly in response to threat. 
Furthermore, these cognitive abnormalities serve to defend themselves when negative 
stimuU threaten their self-esteem (Bentall, 1994). This can be regarded as being consistent 
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with the suggestion of Zigler & Glick (1988) that delusion can be regarded as a form of 
camouflaged depression. 
Lyon et al. (1994) directly investigated this defensive function in patients with 
delusions. Lyon et al. (1994) predicted that if there is a defensive bias in deluded subjects, 
they would show a self-serving bias only when they are required to make expUcit 
attributions in negative situations. When defensive processes are not triggered, this bias 
should be absent and they would attribute negative outcomes to internal causes like 
depressives. In this study, an anglicised version of the Pragmatic Inference Test (PIT; 
Winters & Neale, 1985) and a parallel version of the ASQ (Peterson et al., 1982) were 
given to the deluded, depressed and normal subjects. A parallel version of the ASQ (ASQ 
pf) was especially developed for this study by the researchers based on the expanded ASQ 
(Peterson & Villanova, 1988) because of similarity of the PIT and the original ASQ. The 
PIT is an opaque test in which subjects are not aware of making attributions because the 
PIT is presented as a memory test. Attributions are tapped indirectly when subjects are 
required to make (attributional) inferences in their response to some test items. On the 
other hand, the ASQ pf directly requires subjects to consider the causes of hypothetical 
positive and negative events and then to judge their explanations. On the ASQ pf, the 
results were broadly consistent with the previous findings of Kaney & Bentall (1989) and 
Candido & Romney (1990), showing that the deluded patients made external attribution for 
the negative events. However, on the PIT, the deluded subjects made internal attributions 
for negative events and external attributions for positive events like the depressed subjects. 
These findings suggest that deluded individuals exhibit defensive attributional processes 
which serve to protect them against harboured feeling of low self-esteem. 
Further interpretation of these findings proposed that these defensive processes 
would be triggered only when subjects are required to make an exphcit judgement of blame 
(Kinderman et al, 1992). It has been suggested that implicit judgement and explicit 
judgement are sustained by different cognitive systems (Reber, 1989 ; Berry & Broadbent, 
1988, all cited in Lyon, et al., 1994), and that self-related information presumably activated 
by attributional task is presented at both implicit and explicit levels (Power & Brewin, 
1991). On this view, implicit information is sustained by automatic cognitive process which 
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is fast, unconscious, uncontrollable and non-attention-demanding, whereas, explicit 
information is sustained by controlled process which is slow, conscious, controllable and 
attention-demanding. Thus, Lyon et al (1994) interpreted their findings as showing that 
"the requirement to make explicit attributional judgements would trigger defensive 
responses, whereas the requirement to make implicit attributional judgements would 
produce responses consistent with underlying negative self-schema (p.643)". 
It would be desirable to test the defensive function in deluded patients using 
complementary experimental procedures to those outlined above. As mentioned earlier, the 
studies using the emotional S troop task already examined automatic level of processes in 
deluded patients, and these findings would be regarded as evidence of negative self-
schemata in patients with delusions. However, the emotional Stroop task cannot display 
both automatic and controlled processes which are especially important for considering the 
defensive mechanism. In order to investigate the defensive mechanism, changes in 
responses from an automatic level of process to a controlled level of process should be 
focused on. Therefore, further approaches to defensive functions in people with delusions 
should employ experimental methodologies which are able to reflect both automatic and 
controlled processes, in particular the transition in response between automatic and 
controlled processing. In the next section, the emotional priming paradigm will be 
presented as a methodology which might satisfy this research requirement. 
1.3 The emotional priming paradigm and cognitive processes 
1.3.1 The emotional priming paradigm 
As we have seen, to examine cognitive biases, especially the defensive function in 
deluded patients, requires an assessment of both automatic and controlled cognitive 
processes. The emotional priming paradigm appears to be an appropriate methodology for 
investigating these cognitive processes in people with delusions. The emotional priming 
paradigm was inspired by the work of Neely (1977) and developed by Power & Brewin 
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(1990) for the research on the issue of whether affect and self-esteem regulation processes 
depend on the conscious (controlled) or nonconscious (automatic) information processing 
systems. Neely (1977) varied the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the prime and 
the target letter string in lexical decision tasks and found that the primes can have different 
effects on the processing of the target stimuli, depending on the length of this SOA. Neely 
(1977) showed that, in a lexical decision task, very short SOAs produced automatic 
facilitatory effects which appeared to reflect the permanent associations represented in the 
subjects' memory. On the contrary, at long SOAs, conscious expectations induced by the 
experimenter produced separate facilitatory and inhibitory effects. That is, the pattern of 
responses at the shorter SOA reflect the operation of automatic processes, while the 
response pattern for the longer SOA is the result of both automatic and controlled 
processing. 
1.3.2 The studies from Power & Brewin's viewpoints 
In a preliminary paper. Power & Brewin (1990) developed Neely's (1977) priming 
paradigm in order to investigate the processing of emotion-related material. Power & 
Brewin (1990) used a sentence as a prime and an adjective as a target, and asked the 
subjects to evaluate the target adjectives as self-descriptive or not. Power & Brewin (1990) 
predicted that the normal subjects would show no automatic facilitatory effects since they 
are assumed to have no specific negative or positive permanent associations in their 
memory which seem to produce the automatic effects. In contrast, the subjects would show 
self-esteem regulation operating primarily at controlled processing level, at long SOA. 
Power & Brewin (1990) are implying that priming only occurs with personal episodes. 
While this is starting to be claimed in the mood and memory literature (e.g.. Bower, 1992; 
Eich, 1994), for a long time this was not a focus of the network models (cf.. Bower, 1981). 
In the study, the primes were presented as a sentence describing positive or 
negative life events followed by positive or negative self-descriptive adjectives as the 
targets at either 250 ms or 2000 ms SOA. Two different types of prime were used to test 
the hypothesis. The first type of prime included interpersonal and achievement events which 
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were considered to prompt self-esteem regulation, and the second type consisted of 
survival-threatening events which were not considered to prompt self-esteem regulation. 
Immediately after a positive or negative prime sentence, a target adjective was presented. 
The subjects were required to read a prime sentence quietly to themselves, and then to 
indicate whether or not a target adjective applied to them. The main results of the study 
showed that in normal subjects, following a negative esteem-related prime, the subjects 
took significantly longer to endorse the negative adjectives and also endorsed fewer 
negative adjectives at long SOA than at short SOA. These effects were absent when the 
primes were positives. Power & Brewin (1990) concluded that these results presented "the 
moment-to-moment regulation of self-esteem: In the face of a potential challenge to self-
esteem, normal individuals may protect their self-concept by inhibition of the processing of 
negative self-related information stored in memory (p.47)". In addition they found that, 
contrary to their prediction, following survival-threatening primes the negative adjectives 
were rejected faster at long SOA than at short SOA, and that fewer subjects endorsed the 
negative adjectives at long SOA than at short SOA. 
Power, Brewin, Stuessy & Mahony (1991) assumed that the inhibitory effect found 
in the study of Power & Brewin (1990) would reflect a more general affect-regulation 
effect rather than simply a self-esteem regulation effect. In order to test their prediction, 
they chose single basic emotion terms as primes which reflect a wider range of emotions 
(happiness, sadness, anger, and fear). The results replicated Power & Brewin's (1990) 
study ; at long SOA, negative primes led to slower reaction times to endorse the negative 
adjectives and to fewer endorsement of the negative adjectives. As Power et al. (1991) 
predicted, however, this effect was obtained for all of the negative emotion primes. Thus 
Power et al. (1991) concluded that "in face of a negative emotion-related stimulus..., 
normal individuals set in motion an affect-repair process....this affect-repair is a general one 
that occurs in response to any negative emotion rather than being specific to one particular 
negative basic emotion (p.29)". 
These previous studies focused on affect and self-esteem regulation in normal 
individuals at long SOA rather than paying attention to differences between automatic 
processes and controlled processes. This thesis, however, puts more weight on the latter 
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matter in order to examine the defensive mechanism that might be observed by looking at 
this difference. Therefore, it seems reasonable to summarise the claims of the previous 
studies (Power & Brewin, 1990; Power, et al., 1991) that are relevant to this issue: 
1) normal individuals show no automatic facilitatory effects on self-evaluating 
tasks. 
2) however, affect and self-esteem regulation in normal individuals would be 
operating at both levels of automatic and controlled processing which reflects at 
long SOA. 
In addition, Dalgleish, Cameron, Power and Bond (1995) summarise the findings of 
the previous studies (Power & Brewin, 1990, Power, et al., 1991): 
1) slower to endorse negative adjectives following negative event primes at long 
SOA than at a short SOA. 
2) endorse fewer negative adjectives following negative primes at a long SOA than 
at a short SOA. 
3) in contrast, these effects are absent if the negative adjectives are preceded by 
positive primes rather than negative primes. 
It should be noted that neutral prime conditions were not used in the previous 
studies (Power & Brewin, 1990, Power, 1991). The inclusion of neutral prime conditions is 
vital for interpretation of results, especially for examination of facilitation and inhibition. A 
subsequent study (Dalgleish, et al., 1995) covers this point, and it may be worth mentioning 
that the emotional priming task in this thesis had already been designed to have neutral 
prime conditions before reading the study of Dalgleish et al. (1995). 
1.3.3 The emotional priming paradigm in cUnical subjects 
The previous studies provided evidence that some form of controlled processing 
serves to regulate affect and self-esteem in normal individuals, however, they do not 
address the problem as to whether or not the affect and self-esteem regulation found in 
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normal individuals operates in psychiatric patients, and if it differs in psychiatric patients, 
what sort of processes exist and how they work. The first attempt using the emotional 
priming paradigm to investigate cognitive processes in a clinical group was the study of 
Dalgleish et al. (1995), in which they looked at patients with generalised anxiety disorder. 
It has been suggested that anxious patients seem to have cognitive biases towards 
threat-related material at the automatic processing level, such as perception and attention 
(e.g., MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Richard & French, 
1990, all cited in Dalgleish, et al., 1995), however, such cognitive biases at controlled 
processing level has remained debatable. Therefore, Dalgleish et al. (1995) aimed to 
examine cognitive biases at the level of controlled processing by the emotional priming 
paradigm. In this study, the procedures of Power & Brewin (1990) and Power et al. (1991) 
were modified to include several refinements: The target adjectives were matched for 
length and frequency, the prime sentences were matched for length, and, importantly, a 
neutral-prime condition (a row of Xs) was added to which the results with negative and 
positive primes could be compared. 
The results showed that the clinically anxious were faster to endorse the negative 
adjectives following the negative primes at long SOA than at short SOA relative to the 
neutral-prime conditions. However, they were slower to endorse the positive adjectives 
following the negative primes at long SOA than at short SOA. No facilitation effects for 
the positive adjectives following the negative primes were found. In addition, no facilitation 
effects for both the negative and positive adjectives following the positive primes were 
found. To summarise these findings, affect and self-esteem regulation in the clinically 
anxious group was: 
a) faster endorsement of negative adjectives following negative primes at long SOA 
than at short SOA. 
b) this effect is absent if the primes or the adjectives are positive. 
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A legend shows type of prime 
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Fig. 1.1 
Anxious subjects' mean reaction times for "yes" responses to negative adjectives in 
Dalgleish et al. (1995). 
Dalgleish et al. (1995) concluded that affect and self-esteem regulation in anxious 
subjects would be operating at the level of both automatic and controlled processing, but in 
a different manner to normal subjects. In anxious subjects, negative primes facilitated the 
reaction times for the endorsement of negative adjectives at long SOA more than short 
SOA, which was interpreted as an information processing bias in favour of negative stimuli 
at controlled level of processing. Dalgleish et al. (1995) suggested that "it is possible that 
these data reflect the absence of protective self-regulation processes in clinically anxious 
individuals and that this is a contributing factor to their anxious condition (p.87)." 
The results of this study for the normal subjects supported the earlier studies 
(Power & Brewin, 1990; Power, 1991); following the negative primes, the negative 
adjectives were endorsed more slowly at long SOA than at short SOA. More importantly, 
however, the results of Dalgleish et al. (1995) did not replicate the previous research in 
several ways: 
a) in the normal subjects, slower endorsements of the negative adjectives at long 
SOA than short SOA occurred following all types of prime. 
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A legend shows type of prime 
RT for Negative adjectives in Normals 
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Fig. 1.2 
Normal subjects' mean reaction times for "yes" responses to negative adjectives in 
Dalgleish et al. (1995). 
b) slower endorsement of both negative and positive adjectives at long SOA 
compared to at short SOA following all types of primes. 
A legend shows type of prime 
RT for Positive adjectives in Normals 
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Fig. 1.3 
Normal subjects' mean reaction times for "yes" responses to positive adjectives in 
Dalgleish et al. (1995). 
c) no differences in endorsement of the negative adjectives following the negative 
primes between at long SOA and at short SOA. 
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A legend shows type of prime 
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Fig. 1.4 
Normal subjects' endorsement rate for negative adjectives in Dalgleish et al. (1995). 
Dalgleish et al. (1995) concluded that "the existence of a general effect of SOA on 
the speed to endorse all adjectives in normal subjects which is independent of the prime 
stimulus (p.85)" and there might be "a more greatly organised and elaborated positive self-
schema in these individuals (p.85)". 
1.4 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, cognitive biases in people with delusions have been considered. In 
particular there had been a focus on the arguments of Bentall and his colleagues. Bentall 
(1994) summarised a series of studies as follows: 
a) deluded patients have an abnormal attributional style, generally attributing 
negative outcomes to causes external to themselves. 
b) attributional biases are also shown in their judgements about the explanations of 
the behaviours of other people. 
c) persecuted patients show an exaggerated "self-serving bias" on contingency 
judgement tasks. 
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d) these biases reflect selective information processing for threatening information 
as shown on attention and memory tasks. 
These findings indicate that patients with delusions have much in common with 
depressed patients, however unlike depressives, they have defensive function to protect 
themselves against underlying low self-esteem. Their abnormal beUefs may serve to prevent 
feeling of low self-esteem from entering consciousness. Further experimental research is 
required to test the hypothesis of the defensive mechanism in deluded patients. 
The emotional priming paradigm may be regarded as an appropriate approach to 
this research. The emotional priming paradigm reflects both automatic and controlled 
cognitive processes. 
This thesis directly addresses this issue of the defensive mechanism in people with 
delusions, in following chapters, cognitive processes in patients with delusions will be 
examined by using both an expMcit questionnaire (ASQ) and an implicit questionnaire 
(PIT), as well as the emotional priming paradigm. 
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Chapter 2 Experiment 1: Attributional Bias Tests 
2.1 Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, Bentall and his colleagues found that people with persecutory 
delusions have reasoning and information processing biases to stimuh related to their theme 
of their delusional beliefs, and hypothesised that these cognitive biases may reflect their 
defensive mechanism to protect themselves against underlying negative self-schemata. If 
this defensive mechanism can be bypassed, responses of deluded patients to negative 
stimuli should resemble those of depressed people. 
In this chapter, the defensive function in people with delusions will be directiy 
examined using a similar procedure to Lyon et al. (1994). The Pragmatic Inference Task 
(PIT: Winters & Neale, 1985) was chosen to use as an implicit questionnaire which is 
supposed not to activate the defensive mechanism in deluded patients. The Attributional 
Style Questionnaire (ASQ: Peterson et al., 1982) was chosen as an expUcit measure which 
is expected to trigger the defensive mechanism. Therefore, following the previous studies' 
arguments, it is hypothesised that the deluded patients would show a different attributional 
style from the depressed patients on the ASQ (explicit questionnaire), and would be more 
similar to the normal subjects. In contrast, on the PIT (implicit questionnaire), the deluded 
patients would show that they have more in common with the depressed patients in their 
attributional style. I f these different responses between the ASQ and the PIT are found in 
the deluded patients, it can be concluded that these differences reflect the defensive 
function in people with delusions. 
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2.2 Method 
Subjects: There were three groups of subjects participated in this experiment. The 
National Adult Reading Test (NART: Nelson, 1991) was used as a measure of intellectual 
compatibility across the groups. The subjects were approximately matched for age, sex and 
intelligence across the groups. Table 2.1 shows the subject characteristics and there were 
no significant differences across the groups in age and NART estimated IQ scores. 
The subjects in the experimental group were 11 patients with delusion currentiy 
receiving treatment either and in-patient (6 subjects) or out-patient (5 subjects) basis at the 
time of this study. The criteria for inclusion are: 
1) present delusional symptoms expressed by the patient. 7 patients met the DSM-
3R criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) for paranoid schizophrenia, 2 met the 
criteria for schizoaffective disorder, 1 met the criteria for delusional disorder and 1 for 
bipolar disorder with psychotic features (Appendix 3 shows which subject had which 
diagnosis; the data of the subject diagnosed as bipolar disorder were within a standard 
deviation, and bipolar disorder with psychotic features was included in the deluded subject 
group in Dudley, 1996). 
2) no evidence of any organic impairment, and no current alcohol or drug abuse. 
3) have not received a course of ECT for at least the last month. 
4) aged 18-65. 
The psychiatric comparison group consisted of 11 patients receiving either in-
patient (6 patients) or out-patient (5 patients) receiving treatment for depression at the time 
of study. The criteria for inclusion were: 
1) diagnosed as major depression with no psychotic features. 2 showed anxious 
states (Appendix 3 shows which subject had which diagnosis) at the time of this study. 
2) no evidence of any organic impairment, and no current alcohol or drug abuse. 
3) have not received a course of ECT for at least the last month. 
4) aged 18-65. 
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The normal control group consisted of 11 normal subjects recruited from the non 
academic staff of University of Durham by informal contacts. The criteria were: 
1) no history of psychiatric disturbance requiring treatment. 
2) aged 18-65. 
Table 2.1 
The subjects characteristics 
standard deviations are in brackets 
Group N In- Out- Sex Age NART 
patients patients M F estimated IQ 
Deluded 11 6 5 5 6 43.00 (11.18) 105.57 (8.85) 
Depressed 11 6 5 5 6 39.09 (11.15) 109.50 (6.23) 
Normal 11 5 6 46.45 (10.32) 111.64 (11.10) 
significance N.S. N.S. 
Test Materials: There were two measures administered for all groups: an 
Anglicised version of the PIT (Winters & Neale, 1985) and the original ASQ (Peterson et 
al., 1982). In the previous study (Lyon, et al., 1994), a parallel form of ASQ (ASQ pf) was 
devised for use in their study because the PIT has similarity to the original ASQ. However, 
it was decided to use the original ASQ because of the validity limitations of ASQ pf in 
terms of stability and globaUty scores. Only modest correlations were found between the 
original ASQ and the ASQ pf in stability and globality, and globality for negative events 
failed to reach significance. In addition, the procedure was changed to reduce the influence 
caused by the similarity between the ASQ and the PIT. The experiments were split into two 
sessions, the PIT was given to the subjects in the first session and after at least 3 days (up 
to two weeks) the ASQ was administered in the second session (see Procedure). 
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The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) 
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982) was used to assess 
subjects' overt attributional style. The ASQ consisted of six positive (e.g.. You become 
rich) and six negative hypothetical events (e.g.. You meet a friend who acts hostilely 
towards you) involving subjects. The subjects were required to think of "one major cause" 
of each event, and then to self-rate each cause along 7-point scales of intemality vs. 
extemaUty, stability vs. instability, and globality vs. specificity. Ratings for each event were 
summed for each type of event and for each type of sub-scale separately. 6 to 42 is the 
range of scores for each sub-scale and higher score shows a greater degree of intemality, 
stability and globality. The complete set of ASQ items are shown in Appendix 1. 
The Pragmatic Inference Task (PIT) 
The Pragmatic Inference Task (Winters & Neale, 1985) was presented as a memory 
test in order to avoid controlled responses. The test consisted of 12 short hypothetical 
vignettes, six of them described positive life events and the other six described negative 
events, which were randomly ordered. All stories were self-referent and the main element 
of each story was derived from the ASQ (Peterson et al., 1982). After each vignette, four 
questions were presented as alternative-choice items. One of the questions implied internal-
external locus of causality. For example, the subjects were implicitly asked a reason for 
being unable to find work by choosing either "poor job record (intemal cause)" or "poor 
job market (external cause)". This kind of questions were the target or attributional 
inference questions. Two of the questions required memory of the stated facts (e.g., "How 
long do you go for without finding work?") and the other question required the subjects to 
guess an answer but non-attributional inference (e.g., "What kind of job interests you?"). 
The types of question were also randomly ordered. In this study, the PIT was anglicised to 
be more comprehensible for the British subjects. Only target questions were scored to give 
response frequencies in four categories: intemal and external attributions for negative 
events; intemal and external events for positive events. Ratings were summed across the 
four categories. 0 to 6 is a range of scores for each category and higher scores show 
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greater degree of intemality and externality. Intemality and externality scores in the PIT are 
mutually exclusive. Complete PIT items are shown in Appendix 2. 
Procedure: All tests including the emotional priming task (see Experiment 3 in 
Chapter 4) were administered in a quiet private room. Testing was split into two sessions. 
In the first session, the emotional priming task was carried out and then the PIT was 
presented as a memory test. The subjects listened to the PIT vignettes, and the author read 
aloud corresponding questions and noted the subjects' verbal answers. Following at least 3 
days (up to two weeks), the second session took place. In the second session, the ASQ was 
given to the subjects as a self-administered questionnaire. The subjects were then asked to 
read aloud the words from the NART. Prior to the experiments aU subjects were given a 
brief explanation of the experiments and asked to fill in a consent form. It took 30 minutes 
for the first session and 25 minutes for the second session, all in all it took about an hour to 
complete all experiments. 
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2.3 Results 
Analyses ofASO: The mean ASQ sub-scale scores are shown in Table 2.2. 3 x 2 , 
Group (deluded vs. depressed vs. Normal) x Event (negative vs. positive) two-way 
ANOVAs were carried out separately on intemality, stability and globality scores. Al! 
analyses were performed on SPSS for Windows. 
Table 2.2 
Negative event Positive event 
group mean SD mean SD 
Intemality self-serving 
Deluded 28.0 5.8 29.9 7.5 1.91 
Depressed 29.7 5.4 30.3 5.5 0.55 
Normal 25.2 7.8 29.6 6.6 4.45 
Stability 
Deluded 24.5 5.0 29.8 6.5 
Depressed 29.0 4.3 31.5 4.6 
Normal 27.7 5.4 31.9 4.5 
Globality 
Deluded 27.2 4.4 29.7 5.8 
Depressed 30.9 6.9 30.0 5.3 
Normal 21.1 5.1 27.4 4.5 
On the Intemality scores, a significant main effect of Event was observed [F(l , 30) 
= 4.52, p < .05], however, no other main effects and interactions were significant. That is, 
all subjects including the depressed subjects made more intemal attributions for the positive 
events than for the negative events. 
On the Stability scores, a sigruficant main effect of Event was again observed [F(l , 
30) = 38.18, p < .001], however, no other effect and interaction reached significance. That 
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means, the depressed subjects as well as the deluded and normal subjects made more stable 
attributions for the positive events than for the negative events. 
On the Globality scores, main effects of Group and Event were significant [F(2, 30) 
= 4.61, p < .05 ; F ( l , 30) = 7.14, p < .05, respectively]. The depressed subjects tended to 
make more global attributions than did the deluded and normal subjects, and in the case of 
the positive events all subjects tended to make more global attributions than to the negative 
events. However, these effects were qualified by an interaction of Group x Event [F(2, 30) 
= 4.42, p < .05], thus, simple main effects were analysed for each event and then for each 
group separately. This Group x Event interaction can been seen in Fig. 2.1. 
ASQ Globality scores 
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Fig. 2.1 
ASQ globality scores across Group and Event 
Tests of simple main effects confirmed that for the negative events, the globality 
scores of the depressed subjects were higher than those of the normal subjects (p < .005, by 
Scheffe tests), whereas no significant differences were found either between the deluded 
and the depressed or between the deluded and the normal. The depressed subjects made 
more global attributions for the negative events than both the deluded and the normal 
subjects. No group differences were observed for the positive events. 
Tests of simple main effects also revealed that the normal subjects made more 
global attribudons for the positive events than for the negative events [F(l , 10) = 28.82, p 
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< .001], however both the deluded and depressed subjects made relatively even-handed 
judgements about the causes of positive and negative events (p = .227, p = .637, 
respectively). 
These findings indicates that on the both intemality and stability scores there were 
no group differences. That is, both the depressed and deluded subjects did not show stable 
attributions for the negative events relative to the normal subjects. This was a surprising 
finding. Furthermore, the deluded subjects did not show more internal attributions for the 
positive events compared to the depressed and the normal subjects. Instead, all subjects 
showed similar score pattern on both the intemality and stability scores. These findings 
were non-replication of the results of the previous studies (Kaney & Bentall, 1989; 
Candido & Romney, 1990) where both depressed and deluded subjects, in comparison with 
the normal subjects, made more stable and more global attributions for the negative events. 
In addition, the deluded subjects in the previous studies made more external attributions for 
the negative events, which were opposite response pattern to those of the depressed 
subjects. The group difference was only found on the globality scores, which indicated that 
the depressed subjects made more global attributions for the negative events than both the 
deluded and the normal subjects. 
Following the procedure previously used by Kaney & Bentall (1989) and Lyon et 
al. (1994), "self-serving bias" scores were calculated by subtracting intemality scores for 
the negative events from those for the positive events (these data are shown in Table 2.2). 
A one-way ANOVA was carried out on this data and no group differences were found (p = 
.3403), which again did not replicate the results of the previous studies (Kaney & Bentall, 
1989; Candido & Romney, 1990; Lyon, et al ,1994) where the deluded subjects showed 
greater self-serving bias than both the depressed and normal subjects. 
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Analyses of PIT: The mean PIT intemality and extemality scores were mutually 
exclusive, so only intemality scores are shown in Table 2.3.. 
Table 2.3 
Negative event Positive event 
group mean SD mean SD self-serving 
Deluded 3.27 1.01 3.73 0.90 0.45 
Depressed 3.09 0.83 2.27 1.19 -0.82 
Normal 2.27 1.10 2.36 0.92 0.09 
A 3 X 2, Group (deluded vs. depressed vs. Normal) x Event (negative vs. positive) 
two-way ANOVA was carried out on this data. It was found that a main effect of Group 
was significant [F(2, 30) = 6.44, p < .01] and the interaction of Group x Event was nearly 
significant [F(2, 30) = 3.13, p = .058]. In order to interpret the main effect of Group, the 
mean scores across events were calculated for each group and a one-way ANOVA was 
carried out on this data. This showed that regardless of the event conditions, the deluded 
subjects made more internal ratings (3.50) than both the depressed (2.68) and normal 
subjects (2.32) (p < .005). However, the interaction of Group x Event reached nearly 
significance so as can been seen in Fig. 2.2, thus, further analyses were performed to 
understand where this nearly significant interaction came from. 
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Fig. 2.2 
PIT Internality scores across Group and Event 
In each group, a simple effect of Event was examined. In both the deluded and 
normal subjects this was not significant, however, the depressed subjects showed slightly 
higher intemality scores for the negative events than for the positive events [F(l, 10) = 
4.71, p = .055]. 
A simple effect of Group for each event was then examined. For the negative 
events, Scheffe tests showed nearly significant differences across groups (p = .055). 
Scheffe test is relatively conservative and the result showed nearly-significance, thus, 
Duncan tests were performed on the same data. The only significant difference was found 
between the deluded subjects and the normal subjects. As can be seen Fig. 2.2, the deluded 
patients showed higher intemality scores for the negative events than the normal subjects. 
For the positive events, Scheffe tests showed that the deluded subjects made greater 
internal ratings than both the depressed and normal subjects (p < .005). 
Lyon, et al. (1994) found that the deluded subjects showed similar score pattern on 
the PIT, however, in this study, the deluded subjects were more similar to the normal 
subjects. 
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Further analyses were performed to investigate more precisely any differences in the 
pattern of scores for each group between events by looking at the self-serving bias scores. 
According to the previous studies (Lyon, et al , 1994) the self-serving bias scores were 
calculated by subtracting the scores for negative events from those for positive events. A 
one-way ANOVA on this data revealed a nearly significant difference between groups (p = 
.058). Scheffe tests showed nearly significant difference between groups, again, less 
conservative tests (Duncan test) were carried out on the same data. This showed that the 
deluded subjects (0.45) showed slightly greater self-serving bias than the depressed subjects 
(-0.82). This finding again did not replicate the previous study (Lyon, et al., 1994) where 
the deluded subjects did not show self-serving bias on the PIT. 
2.4 Discussion 
The results appear to be surprising, in particular, the results of the depressed 
subjects were odd. Because of the surprising data, the results of this experiment did not 
support the hypothesis that the deluded subjects would exhibit the defensive function; that 
is, the deluded subjects would resemble the normal subjects rather than the depressed 
subjects on the ASQ (explicit questionnaire) scores, whereas on the PIT (implicit 
questionnaire) the deluded subjects would show similar response pattern to the depressed 
subjects. 
For the ASQ, no group differences were found on the intemality and the stability 
scores. All subjects made more internal and more stable attributions for the positive events 
than for the negative events. According to one of the main arguments on depression (e.g., 
Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978), depressives should show "depressive attributional 
style", internal, stable and global attributions particularly for negative events, however, the 
depressed subjects in this experiment did not show this abnormal attributional style. Only 
on the global scores, the depressed subjects made more global attributions for the negative 
events than for the positive events. 
Not only for the depressed subjects but also for the deluded subjects, the 
hypotheses were not supported by the results. The deluded subjects did not show an 
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extreme self-serving bias on the ASQ, namely, the deluded patients did not show 
abnormally external attributions for the negative events and internal attributions for the 
positive events. One possibility is that the ASQ might not be sensitive enough to highlight 
specific attributional styles, or at least not for testing these hypotheses. 
For the PIT, the deluded subjects were expected to show similarity to the depressed 
subjects, however self-serving bias scores for the deluded subjects in this study showed a 
score pattern closer to the normal subjects than to the depressed subjects. The analysis of 
self-serving bias scores indicated that the deluded subjects showed extreme self-serving 
bias which should have been seen on the ASQ and not on the PIT. These findings might 
again reflect the sensitivity of the PIT; the PIT might not be sensitive enough to penetrate 
the defensive mechanism in patients with delusions. However, it is worth stating that the 
PIT was indeed more sensitive than the ASQ with respect to the intemality score for the 
negative events. Although the deluded subjects scored higher than did the normal and the 
depressed subjects for the positive events, for the negative events the deluded subjects' 
scores did not differ from those of the depressed subjects and were higher than those of the 
normal subjects. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The results from this study did not replicate the previous studies. If the hypothesis 
of a defensive mechanism in people with delusions is not dismissed by these results, one 
possibility to explain why the results did not support the hypothesis is that the ASQ and the 
PIT may not be sensitive enough to reflect their defensive mechanism. Therefore, using 
ASQ and PIT would not be an appropriate methodology for investigating the defensive 
mechanism in deluded patients. I f this is the case, it seems reasonable to apply potentially 
more appropriate methodology to testing the hypothesis. As stated earlier, the emotional 
priming paradigm appears to be suitable. In next chapter, the emotional priming paradigm 
will be applied to examine the defensive mechanism in patients with delusions. 
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Chapter 3 Experiment 2: The Emotional Priming Task in Deluded Subjects 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, explicit and implicit judgement of self-related 
information are assumed to be underpinned by different cognitive processes: when self-
related information is presented at an implicit level it is sustained by automatic cognitive 
process, whereas explicit information is sustained by controlled cognitive process (Power 
& Brewin, 1991). In Experiment 1 in Chapter 2, information involving the subjects was 
presented at both implicit (PIT) and explicit (ASQ) level, and their responses were 
examined to see whether or not the deluded subjects showed a defensive bias only when 
required to make exphcit attributional judgements. The hypothesis was that the deluded 
subjects would show an extreme self-serving bias on the ASQ, however, on the PIT this 
self-serving bias would disappear and they would resemble the depressed subjects. The 
results from Experiment 1 did not show such a clear difference between these two types of 
questionnaire, however there remains a possibility that PIT and ASQ may not be sensitive 
enough to reflect implicit and explicit judgement on self-related information. 
In this chapter, using the emotional priming paradigm developed by Power & 
Brewin (1990), both automatic (implicit) and controlled (explicit) cognitive processes in 
patients with delusions will be investigated. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the emotional 
priming paradigm appears to be another appropriate methodology to investigate both 
automatic and controlled processes. 
The rationale is that at short SOA in the emotional priming task, the deluded 
subjects will give results similar to the depressed subjects. This is because the prime will 
automatically activate the negative adjective, bypassing the usual defensive function of the 
deluded subjects. At long SOA, however, there is time for self-esteem regulation to occur 
to the responses evoked by the prime, so in this case the deluded subjects should give 
responses more similar to those of the normal subjects. Thus, the deluded subjects should 
show even greater self-esteem regulation than the normal subjects at long SOA by 
evaluating themselves more positively and less negatively in the face of negative stimuli (in 
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the negative prime condition). However, at short SOA the deluded subjects should show 
evidence that they would have negative self-schemata, as do the depressed subjects, by 
evaluating themselves more negatively and less positively. The responses at short SOA can 
be regarded as an analogue of PIT and the responses at long SOA as an analogue of ASQ. 
In this chapter, using the emotional priming paradigm developed by Power & 
Brewin (1990), both automatic (implicit) and controlled (explicit) cognitive processes in 
patients with delusions will be investigated. To begin with the experiment, the procedures 
of the previous studies (Power & Brewin, 1990; Power, et al., 1991; Dalgleish et al., 1995) 
have been carefully refined for this study. This will be presented in Method section. 
3.2 Method 
It was decided to make some changes to four aspects of the stimulus presentation 
procedure used by Power and Brewin (1990). Firstiy, they did not include a neutral prime 
condition, which is crucial as a baseline to indicate whether or not negative and positive 
primes produce facilitation or inhibition. 
Secondly, their priming stimuli stayed on for the full duration of the SOA period for 
both their short and long SOAs. Thus, the stimulus duration was varied in addition to SOA. 
Since the priming stimuU in this paradigm consist of several words, it was thought prudent 
to hold the prime duration constant and only vary SOA to make sure that any differences 
do not occur because of reading time available for the prime. 
Thirdly, they overwrote their primes with a 20 ms pattern mask (consisting of a row 
of Xs). While this might be the method of choice in studies of 'subliminal' priming, the 
rationale for it in their procedure was not given by Power and Brewin (1990). Since 
masking adds an additional level of complexity and no clear reason was given for its 
inclusion, it was decided to omit this step. The procedure used here was thus more in line 
with studies that have looked at the effect of short and long SOAs on affective priming 
(Hermaris, De Houwer & Eelen, 1994) and attitude priming using good-bad judgements 
(Fazio, Sambonmatsu, Powell & Kardes, 1986). 
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The fourth issue concemed the duration chosen for the short SOA. It was decided 
to use the upper limit of SOA compatible with facilitation in priming. This was because the 
prime in this paradigm consists of a series of words rather than a single word and could 
therefore take longer to encode. In particular, the patient groups might need maximum time 
because of their reading level and/or medication. Thus 500 msec was chosen. Although it 
has been suggested that this time might be 'marginal' (Wells & Matthews, 1994), it has 
certainly shown facilitation in studies looking at effects of varied SOA to threat-related 
primes (e.g., Richards & French, 1992) and has also shown good facihtation in 
demonstrations of semantic priming in undergraduate lab classes in University of Durham 
(D. Kleinman, unpublished data). 
Finally, considering the performance of the psychiatric subjects, the number of trials 
were reduced to 96 trials so that the clinical subjects could maintain concentration on the 
tasks. 
Subject: All subjects were same as those who participated in Experiment 1 in 
Chapter 2; 11 patients with delusions, 11 depressive patients and 11 normal subjects. The 
criteria and the characteristics of the subjects are shown in the Method in Chapter 2. 
Materials: The priming stimuli consisted of sentences describing certain life events 
which were modified from the previous studies of the emotional priming paradigm (Power 
& Brewin, 1990 ; Dalgleish et al., 1995). The primes were either positive (e.g., "A date 
goes well") or negative (e.g., "You lose your job"), matched for length as far as possible. 
There were 8 positive and 8 negative primes, plus a set of 8 neutral primes consisting of 2 
X 2 THEs (a complete list of the primes is shown in Appendix 7). All primes were 4 words 
long and presented over two hues, with two words per line. This was to make sure that the 
prime was seen in central vision. 
The target stimuli consisted of positive and negative trait adjectives. Frequency and 
length of words were carefully considered. According to the previous study (Power & 
Brewin, 1990; Power, 1991; Dalgleish et al., 1995), the emotional priming effect occurs 
only when the target stimuli are negative, and not to positive stimuli. Thus, in order to 
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select negative stimuli, more careful consideration was required. It was assumed that 
different adjectives in addition to their good-bad valence have different 'intensity' values, 
so that impact of the meaning of the word (word intensity) would vary. Thus certain 
words have strong meanings so that individuals would rarely regard these words as self-
descriptive, while other words would allow them to be endorsed as self-descriptive more 
easily. To balance the intensity of negative stimuH, 87 negative adjectives were drawn 
mainly from the previous studies (Power & Brewin, 1990; Dalgleish et al., 1995) and 
augmented from the other studies (John, 1988; Anderson, 1968; Zuckerman & Lubin, 
1965; a complete set of negative word intensity list is shown in Appendix 6). Then, lists of 
these negative words were distributed to 16 undergraduate students taking Psychology at 
University of Durham. The students were required to rate how strong the feehng was that 
each word conveyed to them on a scale from one to three (1 = mild, 2 = average, 3 = 
intense). 48 negative adjectives were selected with reference to the results of this word 
intensity list. 48 positive adjectives were selected carefully from the previous studies 
(Power & Brewin, 1990; Dalgleish et al., 1995) and Anderson (1968). The positive and 
negative adjectives were matched for length and frequency as much as possible. All in all a 
set of 48 negative and 48 positive adjectives were selected as the target situmuli (a 
complete list of target words is shown in Appendix 8). All target adjectives were presented 
in the centre of the screen in lowercase letters 5 mm high. 
Apparatus: The emotional priming study was run on a BBC model B 
Microcomputer. Text was displayed in 40 column mode on Monochrome 12 inch monitor. 
In this experiment, the sequence of fields consisted of a prime display and a target display; 
a prime was presented for 300 ms. Primes were presented in upper case letters 5 mm high. 
After a duration of 200 or 1700 ms (i.e. 500 ms or 2000 ms SOA), a target adjective was 
presented. Target stimuli were presented in lower case letters, 5 mm high. In order to 
maintain timing accuracy, displays were always initiated by the vertical screen synch pulse. 
The target adjective remained on the screen until the subject responded "yes" or "no" on 
one of two hand-held buttons to indicate whether or not it was self-descriptive. The 
programme automatically recorded reaction times in milliseconds and key choices. 
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Design: A mixed factorial design was used. For each of the three groups, there 
were two durations of SOA (either 500 or 2000 ms), three valences of prime (positive, 
negative or neutral), and two types of target adjective (positive or negative) to give a total 
of 12 (2 X 3 X 2) conditions. 
The experiment was presented in 8 blocks of 12 trials. Each block of 12 contained 
one trial of each combination of 2 durations of SOA (short or long), 2 adjectives (negative 
or positive) and 3 primes (negative, positive or neutral). Over the 8 blocks it was arranged 
that each of the 8 negative primes occurred once with each of the four combinations of 
SOA (short or long) and adjective (negative or positive), giving 32 trials in all over the 
whole set of 96 trials. A similar arrangement was made for positive primes. The remaining 
32 trials had the neutral prime ( 2 x 2 THEs). The same prime never occurred more than 
once in a block. 
The program randomised the order of presentation of the 8 blocks and randomised 
the order of presentation within a block. The adjectives were also balanced as far as 
possible within a block for word frequency, length and impact. Because this constrained the 
adjectives to a particular condition, it meant that there were pre-set combinations of SOA, 
primes and adjectives. In order to counterbalance this, two different sets of SOA-prime-
adjective pairings were used (see Appendix 9), based on endorsement rates of the 
adjectives when given to student subjects as a pencil and paper test. 
Procedure: The experiment was carried out in a quiet private room. As described 
in Experiment 1 in Chapter 2, the emotional priming task was carried out in addition to 
administering the PIT in the first session of the experiment (see Procedure of Experiment 1 
in Chapter 2). The emotional priming task was introduced by instmctions displayed on a 
computer. The subjects were asked to make decisions about themselves as quickly as 
possible and told that before the adjectives were presented on the screen, either a short 
sentence or four words ( 2 x 2 THEs) would be flashed. Then the subjects were informed 
that their task was to decide whether or not various adjectives were self-descriptive. 
Finally, the subjects were asked to respond as fast as possible to each trial by pressing 
either the "yes" or "no" button. The instmctions emphasised that the subjects were 
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expected to respond as quickly as possible and that this experiment focused on their 
reaction times. 
The subjects were first presented with 16 practice trials in order to ensure that they 
understood the procedure. During the practice trials, the subjects were given feedback of 
their reactions, which showed on the screen that their reply was either "It applies to me" or 
"It does not apply to me". The practice trials were self-paced, the subjects needing to press 
both buttons after each practice trial to continue. After the practice trials, the instructions 
reconfirmed the subjects' task and informed them that the experimental trials would appear 
automatically without pressing both keys to continue, and that they could have a rest after 
each block of trials. Then, the first block was presented. All in all it took about 13 minutes 
to complete. 
3.3 Results 
Overview: The analyses of the results will be presented in two main stages. First, 
the analyses of proportions of "yes" responses to the target adjectives across SOA and 
prime type will be presented. Second, the analyses of the mean reaction times for combined 
"yes" and "no" responses will be presented, and then the mean reaction times for "yes" 
responses to the positive adjectives and for "no" responses to the negative adjectives will 
be examined separately. These separate analyses for each type of responses were used in 
order to examine self-esteem regulation more clearly. Both endorsement of positive 
adjectives and rejection of negative adjectives are regarded as having a self-esteem 
enhancing function, thus it seems sensible to focus on these data. However, it should be 
noted that the analysis of "no" RTs to the negative adjectives could not be performed for 
the depressed subjects since they tended to accept negative adjectives as self-referent, so 
there were too many empty cells in this condition. 
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Analyses of endorsement levels: The table below shows the mean proportions of 
"yes" responses for each of the three groups across both SOAs, three types of prime and 
both types of adjectives. The analyses were carried out on SPSS for Windows. 
Table 3.1 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses 
standard deviations are in brackets 
500ms 2000ms 
group prime Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral 
Deluded Negative 0.38 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.41 
n= 11 adjective (0.18) (0.25) (0.28) (0.24) (0.29) (0.27) 
Positive 0.69 0.76 0.65 0.58 0.68 0.81 
adjective (0.19) (0.25) (0.26) (0.22) (0.15) (0.19) 
Depressed Negative 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.73 0.61 0.65 
n = 11 adjective (0.26) (0.25) (0.28) (0.29) (0.35) (0.29) 
Positive 0.60 0.64 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.63 
adjective (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Normal Negative 0.27 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.33 
n= 11 adjective (0.26) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) 
Positive 0.72 0.78 0.74 0.70 0.80 0.90 
adjective (0.21) (0.13) (0.24) (0.23) (0.16) (0.09) 
An overall 2 (SOA: 500msec vs. 2000msec) x 3 (Prime: negative vs. positive vs. 
Neutral) x 2 (Adjective: negative vs. positive) x 3 (Group: deluded vs. depressed vs. 
normal) analysis of variance for all variables were performed on these data in order to 
investigate any difference across the groups. 
An overall 2 x 3 x 2 x 3 , SOA x Prime x Adjective x Group ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of Adjective [F(l , 30) = 13.29, p < .01], interactions of Group x 
Adjective [F(2, 30) = 7.83, p < .005] and SOA x Prime [F(2, 60) = 3.83, p < .05], and a 
three-way interaction of SOA x Prime x Adjective [F(2, 60) = 7.35, p < .005]. 
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The main effect of Adjective indicated that more positive adjectives (0.52) tended 
to be endorsed than the negative adjectives (0.47), however, this main effect was qualified 
by the interaction of Group x Adjective. Simple main effects were analysed to understand 
this interaction. The endorsement rates for each adjective were collapsed across Prime and 
SOA and compared across the groups for each adjective separately. As can be seen in Fig. 
3.1, the depressed subjects showed higher endorsement levels for the negative adjectives 
and less endorsement of the positive adjectives compared to the deluded and the normal 
subjects. Tests of simple main effect of Group confirmed that the depressed subjects 
endorsed the negative adjectives more than both the deluded and the normal subjects 
(Scheffe test, p < .001). For the positive adjectives, no group differences were found (p = . 
0889). In addition, tests of simple main effect of Adjective indicated that both deluded and 
control subjects endorsed more positive adjectives than the negative adjectives [F(l , 10) = 
7.74, p < .05 ; F ( l , 10) = 11.17, p < .005, respectively], however significant effect of 
Adjective was not found in the depressed subjects. The depressed subjects endorsed both 
types of adjectives almost equally. 
Yes responses Group x Adjective 
deluded depressed 
group 
I negative 
I positive 
control 
Fig. 3.1 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses across Group and Adjective 
In order to understand the interaction of SOA x Prime, the proportions of "yes" 
responses were collapsed across the groups and the adjectives (Fig. 3.2). As can be 
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assumed from Fig. 3.2, it seems that the positive primes facilitated the endorsement rate of 
the target adjectives at 500 ms SOA and both the negative and the positive primes inhibited 
the endorsement rate at 2000 ms SOA. 
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Fig. 3.2 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses across SOA and Prime, collapsed across 
Group and Adjective 
However, this interaction was qualified by the three-way interaction of SOA x 
Prime x Adjective, thus, the mean proportions of "yes" responses were collapsed across the 
groups and then sub-ANOVAs were performed for each type of adjective separately (these 
data are shown in Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses across SOA, Prime and Adjective, 
500ms 2000ms 
Negative Positive Negative Positive 
prime adjective adjective adjective adjective 
Negative 0.45 0.67 0.50 0.61 
Positive 0.46 0.73 0.43 0.69 
Neutral 0.48 0.64 0.46 0.78 
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For the negative adjectives, nothing reached significance. In the case of the positive 
adjectives, a SOA x Prime interaction was found [F(2, 64) = 10.22, p < .001] (shown in 
Fig. 3.3). Therefore, the interaction of SOA x Prime was further analysed but only for the 
positive adjectives. 
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Fig. 3.3 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses for positive adjectives across SOA and type 
of prime 
In order to interpret this interaction, a simple main effect of Prime was analysed for 
each SOA by looking at the contrast terms which compared the three possible permutations 
of pairs of prime. At 500 ms SOA, the subjects endorsed more positive adjectives following 
the positive primes than following the neutral primes [F(l , 32) = 5.45, p < .05]. At 2000 
ms SOA, less positive adjectives were endorsed following either the negative or positive 
primes than following the neutral primes [F(l , 32) = 13.85, p < .005 ; F( l , 32) = 6.67, p < 
.05, respectively]. 
A simple effect of SOA was then analysed. Following either the negative or the 
positive primes, the endorsement rates of the positive adjectives did not differ between 
SOAs, however, following the neutral primes more positive adjectives were endorsed at 
500 ms SOA than at 2000 ms SOA [F(l , 32) = 13.51, p < .005]. 
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Analyses of the mean reaction times (RT): The table below shows the mean 
reaction times for combined "yes" and "no" responses across both SOAs, the three types of 
prime, both types of adjective and for each of three groups. 
Table 3.3 
The mean reaction times for combined "yes" and "no" responses 
standard deviations are on bracicets 
500ms 2000ms 
group prime Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral 
Deluded Negative 2100.6 2021.9 1740.3 2068.1 2239.8 1980.0 
n= 11 adjective (654.6) (739.4) (587.0) (659.6) (1022.5) (666.8) 
Positive 1889.6 1833.8 1785.9 1921.0 1872.0 1577.4 
adjective (576.6) (591.8) (608.6) (687.3) (633.2) (444.8) 
Depressed Negative 1675.8 1781.5 1571.3 1495.1 1789.5 1570.8 
n= 11 adjective (452.8) (498.6) (569.4) (412.3) (590.4) (565.4) 
Positive 1639.1 1484.2 1546.2 1682.1 1661.3 1543.8 
adjective (484.3) (398.2) (412.3) (505.5) (538.1) (447.2) 
Normal Negative 1610.1 1652.7 1576.7 1570.8 1604.8 1483.5 
n= 11 adjective (449.4) (656.9) (539.3) (445.7) (485.0) (396.1) 
Positive 1543.5 1493.5 1510.4 1556.2 1500.7 1258.5 
adjective (576.8) (537.6) (441.6) (504.6) (434.9) (382.2) 
An overall 2 (SOA: 500 ms vs. 2000 ms) x 3 (Prime: negative vs. positive vs. 
neutral) x 2 (Adjective: negative vs. positive) x 3 (Group: deluded vs. depressed vs. 
normal) analysis of variance for all variables were performed on these mean reaction times 
for combined "yes" and "no" responses. 
The overall ANOVA for the mean reaction times showed significant main effects of 
Prime [F(2, 60) = 7.88, p < .01] and Adjective [F(l, 30) = 6.66, p < .05], interactions of 
Prime x Adjective [F(2, 60) = 4.05, p < .05] and Group x SOA x Adjective [F(2, 30) = 
4.09, p < .05]. 
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To understand the main effect of Prime, the reaction times data were first collapsed 
across Group, SOA and Adjective, and then the three possible permutations of pairs of 
prime type were compared. These showed that in general, the subjects were slower 
following either the negative primes (1729.3 ms) or the positive primes (1744.6 ms) than 
following the neutral primes (1594.6 ms). The main effect of Adjective indicated that the 
subjects took longer to respond to the negative adjectives (1751.9 ms) than to the positive 
adjectives (1627.2 ms). However, these main effects were qualified by the interaction of 
Prime x Adjective, thus further analyses were performed to understand this interaction. 
The reaction times data were collapsed across Group and SOA and simple main 
effects were examined. These data are shown in Table 3.4 and Fig. 3.4. 
Table 3.4 
The mean reaction times across Prime and Adjective, collapsed across Group and 
SOA 
Negative prime Positive prime Neutral prime mean 
Negative adjective 1753.4 1848.4 1653.8 1751.9 
Positive adjective 1705.2 1640.9 1535.5 1627.2 
mean 7729.5 1744.6 1594.6 
A simple main effect of Adjective showed that in the positive prime conditions, the 
subjects took longer to respond to the negative adjectives than the positive adjectives [F(l , 
32) = 16.39, p < .001], however, such effects were not found following either the negative 
primes or the control primes [F(l , 32) = .47, p = .500 ; F(l,32) = .06, p = .807, 
respectively]. 
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Fig. 3.5 
The mean reaction times across Prime and Adjective, collapsed across Group and 
SOA 
Tests of a simple main effect of Prime by the comparison across the three possible 
permutations of pairs of prime type indicated that in the case of the negative adjectives, the 
subjects were slower to respond following the positive primes than following the neutral 
primes [F( l , 32) = 10.32, p < .005]. The subjects were also slightly slower with the 
negative primes than with the neutral primes [F(l , 32) = 4.30, p = .046], and with positive 
primes than with the negative primes [F(l , 32) = 4.15, p = .050]. In the case of the positive 
adjectives, the subjects were slower following the negative primes than following either the 
positive and neutral primes [F(l , 32) = 8.24, p < .01 ; F( l , 32) = 4.76, p < .05, 
respectively]. That is, for both types of adjectives, the subjects were always slower in the 
negative and positive prime conditions than in the neutral prime conditions. 
In order to interpret the three-way interaction of Group x SOA x Adjective, the 
reaction times data were collapsed across Prime (shown in Table 3.5 and Fig. 3.6) and 
analysed for each SOA and then for each adjective type separately. 
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Table 3.5 
500ms 2000ms 
group Negative adj. Positive adj. Negative adj. Positive adj. 
Deluded 1954.3 1836.5 2096.0 1790.1 
Depressed 1676.2 1556.5 1618.5 1626.1 
Normal 1613.2 1515.8 1553.0 1438.5 
At 500ms SOA, a Group x Adjective sub-ANOVA was carried out. Only the main 
effect of Adjective reached significance [F(l , 30) = 4.72, p < .05]. As can be seen in Table 
3.4 and Fig. 3.3, the subjects showed slower response to the negative adjectives than to the 
positive adjectives at 500ms SOA. 
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Fig. 3.6 
Three-way interaction of SOA x Adjective x Group in the mean reaction times 
At 2000ms SOA, a similar analysis was performed. There was found to be a main 
effect of Adjective [F(l , 30) = 6.23, p < .05] and a nearly-significant interaction of Group x 
Adjective [F(2, 30) = 2.74, p = .081]. These can be interpreted as the subjects tending to be 
slower to respond to the negative adjectives than the positive adjectives, but it was not the 
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case for the depressed subjects as can be seen in Table 3.5, which would be a causal factor 
of the Group x Adjective interaction. 
The Group x SOA interaction was then analysed for each adjective separately. In 
the case of the negative adjectives, nothing reached significance. In the case of the positive 
adjectives, again, no significant effects were found. 
In order to analyse the three-way interaction of SOA x Adjective x Group further, 
the mean reaction times for combined "yes" and "no" responses were analysed for each 
group separately. 
Table 3.6 
The deluded subjects' mean reaction times across Prime, collapsed across SOA and 
Negative prime Positive prime Control prime 
Deluded 1994.8 1991.9 1770.9 
In the deluded group, a 2 x 3 x 2, SOA x Prime x Adjective ANOVA revealed that 
there was a significant main effect of Prime [F(2, 20) = 7.14, p < .01]. To analyse this 
effect further, first the mean reactions times were collapsed across SOA and Adjective (the 
data are shown in Table 3.6), then these data vyere analysed by looking at the contrast 
terms which compared the three possible permutations of pairs of prime type. These 
contrasts showed that following either the negative or the positive primes the deluded 
subjects were slower to respond to the target adjectives than following the neutral primes 
[F( l , 10) = 7.94, p < .05 ; F( l , 10) = 10.72, p < .01, respectively], however, there was no 
significant difference between following negative primes and following positive primes 
[F( l , 10) = .00, p = .958]. In addition, a nearly-significant main effect of Adjective [F(l , 
10) = 4.25, p = 0.66] was found. The deluded subjects tended to be slower to respond to 
the negative adjectives (2025.2 ms) than the positive adjectives (1813.3 ms). 
In the depressed group, a 2 x 3 x 2, SOA x Prime x Adjective, ANOVA showed 
that there was an interaction of Prime x Adjective [F(2, 30) = 5.96, p < .05]. To interpret 
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this interaction, the mean reaction times were collapsed across SOA, and simple effects 
were analysed on these data (the data are shown in Table 3.7 and Fig. 3.7). 
Table 3.7 
The depressed subjects' mean reaction times across Prime and Adjective, collapsed 
across SOA 
Negative prime Positive prime Control prime 
Negative adjective 1585.5 1785.5 1571.0 
Positive adjective 1660.6 1572.7 1540.5 
Depressives' RT Prime x Adjective 
1800.0 
1750.0 
1700.0 
1650.0 
1600.0 
1550.0 
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Fig. 3.7 
The depressed subjects' mean reaction times across Prime and Adjective, summed 
across SOA 
A simple main effect of Prime for the negative adjectives nearly reached significance 
[F(2, 20) = 2.82, p = .083], but not for the positive adjectives [F(2, 20) = 1.10, p = .351]. 
The simple main effect of Prime for the negative adjectives was further analysed by the 
comparison across the three possible permutations of pairs of prime type. This indicated 
that the depressed subjects were slower to respond to the negative adjectives following the 
positive primes than following the negative primes (p < .05), however, such difference 
between the positive and the neutral primes was not confirmed (p = 0.127). It may be 
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acceptable to perform these analyses given the nearly significant simple effect of Prime for 
the negative adjectives (p = .083), but given that there was no hint of significance for the 
simple effect of Prime on positive adjectives (p = .351), this was analysed no further. 
A simple main effect of Adjective was then interpreted. In the positive prime 
conditions, the depressed subjects took longer to respond to the negative adjectives than to 
the positive adjectives [F(l , 10) = 7.73, p < .05]. However, it was found that the mean 
reaction times did not differ between the two types of adjectives in either the negative or 
the neutral prime conditions. That is, the depressed subjects were slower to respond to the 
negative adjectives than to the positive adjectives following the positive primes, but not 
when following either the negative or the neutral primes. 
In the normal group, a 2 x 3 x 2, SOA x Prime x Adjective, ANOVA showed that 
no main effects nor interactions reached significance. 
Analyses of RTs for "yes" and "no" responses separately: As mentioned in 
Overview of the analyses, to analyse the mean reaction times for "yes" responses to the 
positive adjectives and for "no" responses to the negative adjectives appears to be another 
way to investigate self-esteem regulation. Endorsement of the positive adjectives and 
rejection of the negative adjectives are both regarded as self-esteem enhancing, therefore, 
not only the endorsement levels, but also the reaction times for positive endorsement and 
for negative rejection would reflect how the subjects regulate their self-esteem. For 
instance, if the deluded subjects take longer to endorse the positive adjectives than the 
normal subjects even when their endorsement rates are not different, it would be concluded 
that the deluded subjects might have negative self-schemata, therefore, they need more time 
to say "yes" to the positive adjectives, or at least it can be assumed that more controlled 
processes are required in the deluded subjects. 
In the analyses of the RTs for "yes" responses to the positive adjectives, one 
depressed subject was excluded because of empty cells for these analyses. For the same 
reason, in the analyses of the RTs for "no" responses to the negative adjectives, one 
deluded subject was excluded for the analyses. It should be noted again that the depressed 
subjects tended to accept the negative adjectives as self-descriptive, thus the analysis of 
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RTs for rejection of the negative adjectives could not be performed for the depressed 
subjects. 
The mean reaction times for "yes" responses to the positive adjectives across both 
SOAs and the three types of prime are shown in Table 3.8, and for "no" responses to the 
negative adjectives are shown in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.8 
The mean reaction times for "yes" responses to the positive adjectives across SOA, 
Prime and Group 
500 ms 2000 ms 
Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral 
Deluded 1734.6 1883.7 1597.7 2021.5 1662.5 1470.5 
(n = l l ) 
Depressed 1510.1 1547.2 1497.7 1513.6 1503.7 1217.5 
(n = 10) 
Normal 1284.0 1224.6 1227.1 1233.0 1273.8 1103.5 
(n = l l ) 
An overall 2 (SOA: 500 ms vs. 2000 ms) x 3 (Prime: negative vs. positive vs. 
neutral) x 3 (Group: deluded vs. depressed vs. normal) analysis of variance for all variables 
were performed on these mean reaction times for "yes" responses. This showed that there 
was a main effect of Prime [F(2, 58) = 7.22, p < .005], however, the other effects and 
interactions failed to reach significance. To interpret the main effect of Prime, the mean 
reaction times for endorsement of the positive adjectives were collapsed across SOA and 
Group, and then analysed by looking at the contrast terms which compared the three 
possible permutations of pairs of prime type. These contrasts revealed that the subjects 
were slower to endorse the positive adjectives following either the negative (1650.6 ms) or 
the positive primes (1510.7 ms) than following the neutral prime (1379.9 ms) (p < .005 ; p 
< .05, respectively). 
Since any effects involving Group factor appeared to be non-significant, SOA x 
Prime ANOVAs were carried out for each group separately in order to investigate further 
the mean reaction times for "yes" responses to the positive adjectives within each group. 
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In the deluded subjects, a main effect of Prime was significant [F(2, 20) = 7.38, p 
<.005]. The RTs for endorsement of the positive adjectives were collapsed across SOA and 
then analysed by looking at the contrast terms which compared the three possible 
permutations of pairs of prime type. These contrasts showed that the deluded subjects took 
longer to endorse the positive adjectives following either the negative (1878.1 ms) or the 
positive primes (1773.1 ms) than following the neutral primes (1543.1 ms) (p < .05 ; p < 
.05, respectively). No other effects and interactions reached significance. 
In both the depressed and the normal subjects, SOA x Prime ANOVAs showed that 
no effects and interactions appeared to be significant. 
Table 3.9 
The mean reaction times for "no" responses to the negative adjectives between 
500 ms 2000 ms 
Negative Positive Control Negative Positive Control 
Deluded 2631.3 2431.0 1854.4 2219.5 2280.5 2195.7 
(n = l l ) 
Normal 1675.4 1914.5 1548.2 1449.2 1605.2 1474.4 
(n = l l ) 
Table 3.9 shows the mean reaction times for rejection of the negative adjectives 
between the deluded and the normal subjects across SOA and Prime. 
An overall 2 (SOA: 500 ms vs. 2000 ms) x 3 (Prime: negative vs. positive vs. 
neutral) x 2 (Group: deluded vs. normal) analysis of variance for all variables were 
performed on these mean reaction times for rejection of the negative adjectives. This 
revealed that there was a nearly significant main effect of Group [F(l , 19) = 4.17, p = 
.055]. That is, the deluded subjects tended to be slower to reject the negative adjectives 
than the normal subjects regardless of both SOA and Prime. 
SOA X Prime ANOVAs were then carried out for the deluded and the normal 
subjects separately. However, no main effects or interactions reached significance in either 
group. 
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3.4 Discussion 
The present study sought to refine the emotional priming paradigm and apply it to 
patients with delusions to see whether the deluded subjects would indicate a negative 
response style similar to that of depressed subjects at short SOA. Further it was argued 
that this negative response style would be hidden, and by contrast transformed into an 
extreme form of positive response style at long SOA. 
The results of this study did not support this hypothesis. However, the results 
showed some hints that the deluded subjects might have negative self-schemata and a 
defensive mechanism to prevent themselves from experiencing negative feelings. 
Although the deluded subjects endorsed relatively more positive adjectives than 
negative adjectives like the normal subjects, in absolute terms they seemed to endorse 
sUghtly fewer positive adjectives and slightiy more negative adjectives than the normal 
subjects. Considering the mean reaction times, the deluded subjects took significantiy 
longer to respond to the negative adjectives than to the positive adjectives, which was not 
found in the normal subjects. In addition, the deluded subjects were slower to reject the 
negative adjectives than the normal subjects. These findings could be interpreted to indicate 
that making judgements on negative stimuh requires more controlled processing than 
making judgements on positive stimuli in the deluded subjects in order to prevent their low 
self-esteem from being excited. This interpretation raises the question of whether the 
negative primes would make the deluded patients defensive. Indeed, the deluded patients 
generally became slower in the negative prime conditions than in the neutral prime 
conditions, but they were also slower following the positive primes than the neutral 
primes. It might be concluded that the deluded subjects would be sensitive to any 
meaningful stimuli, however when they are required to make judgements on negative 
valued matters, this judgmental processing would take the first priority since they need to 
protect themselves against feelings of low self-esteem. Their defensive function would be 
activated only by requirement to make exphcit judgement on negative valued matters about 
the self. This argument is consistent with the previous findings (Kinderman, et al., 1991 ; 
Lyon et al., 1994). 
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The depressed subjects showed interesting results. They endorsed the negative and 
the positive adjectives even-handedly, although they endorsed more negative adjectives 
than did the deluded and the normal subjects. Not surprisingly, the depressed subjects 
endorsed fewer positive adjectives than the control subjects. These findings partly 
replicated the previous study (Power, Cameron & Dalgleish, 1996) where the subjects in 
the depressed group endorsed more adjectives in total than did the subjects in the control 
group. In the present study, though, no effects of either Prime or SOA on endorsement 
rates were found, whereas Power et al. (1996) found that the endorsement rates were 
influenced by the primes in the depressed subjects. However Prime effects were found in 
the reaction times to negative adjectives and in the reaction times for endorsement of 
positive adjectives. As shown in fig 3.7, the depressed subjects were slower to respond to 
the negative adjectives following the positive primes than following the neutral primes. 
They were also slower to respond to the negative adjectives than the positive adjectives in 
the positive prime conditions. In addition, they took longer to endorse the positive 
adjectives following either the negative or the positive primes than following the neutral 
primes. This could be interpreted as the depressed patients being generally sensitive to 
stimuli; in particular, the incongruent valence pairs of a prime and target would slow down 
the depressed subjects. 
The results from this study for the control subjects also failed to replicate the 
findings of the previous studies. They only showed the significant effect of Adjective on the 
endorsement rates; endorsing more positive adjectives than the negative adjectives. In the 
reaction times for both combined and separated "yes" and "no" responses, no effects were 
found. This raises the possibility that this emotional priming paradigm might not clearly 
reflect differences between automatic and controlled processes. Further research is required 
to re-examine the emotional priming paradigm in a larger number of normal subjects. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The principal results of this study did not replicate the findings of the previous 
studies (Power & Brewin, 1990 ; Power, et al., 1991 ; Dalgleish at al., 1995) in normal 
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subjects. Rather, there remains a doubt as to whether the emotional priming paradigm 
would reflect both automatic and controlled processes, and whether it would be a 
appropriate methodology for this kind of research. Therefore, more research is required to 
investigate further the emotional priming paradigm in a larger number of normal subjects. 
In the next chapter, the emotional priming paradigm will be examined more carefully in a 
number of student subjects. 
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Chapter 4 Experiment 3: The Emotional Priming Task in Student Subjects 
4.1 Introduction 
Power & Brewin (1990) developed the emotional priming paradigm based on the 
work of Neely (1977) to investigate the effects of priming on a self-evaluation task. It was 
predicted that the presentation of salient information should automatically prime the related 
information stored in long term memory. For example, if positive primes facilitate the 
endorsement of positive trait adjectives as self-descriptive, this is regarded as a positive 
automatic facilitatory effect which would be evidence of positive self-representations in 
memory. Similarly, i f negative primes facilitate endorsed negative targets, it would be 
regarded as a negative automatic facilitatory effect reflecting negative self-schemata. 
Adapting the findings of Neely's study in a lexical decision task, it was hypothesised that 
short SOA would reflect automatic effects, however, at long SOA conscious strategies 
would take place. Therefore, the emotional priming paradigm is thought to involve both 
automatic and controlled processing. According to the predictions of Power & Brewin 
(1990), i f this is the case, people with negative self-schemata such as depression could 
show negative automatic facilitatory effects at short SOA, however, healthy individuals 
might not show such automatic facilitatory effects unless they have actually had the 
experiences in question. In the previous studies (Power & Brewin, 1990 ; Power, et al., 
1991), it was also predicted that normal individuals would indicate the greatest self-esteem 
regulation at long SOA when primed by negative stimuli in order to present themselves in 
the best possible light. As summarised in Chapter 1, the summary of the findings from the 
previous studies is: 
1) Normal individuals show no automatic facilitatory effects on self-evaluating tasks. 
2) However, self-esteem regulation in normal individuals would be operating at the level of 
both automatic and of controlled processing which is reflected at long SOA by: 
a) being slower to endorse negative adjectives following negative primes at long 
SOA than at a short SOA, 
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b) endorsing fewer negative adjectives following negative primes at long SOA than 
at short SOA 
c) in contrast, these effects are absent if the negative adjectives are preceded by 
positive primes rather than negative primes. 
In this chapter, it will be examined whether the emotional priming task used in 
Experiment 2 in Chapter 3 would be able to assess both automatic and controlled processes 
on the self-evaluation task in healthy student subjects. In particular, as mentioned above, 
student subjects should show greater self-esteem regulation at long SOA than at short SOA 
in the negative prime conditions, and no prime effects would be expected at short SOA 
since automatic facilitatory effects might not be found in normal individuals. 
4.2 Method 
Subject: A sample of 52 students taking psychology at University of Durham and 
Open University. There were 17 male and 35 female with a mean age of 24.56 years (SD = 
10.86) in the sample. 
Materials: The priming and target stimuli used in Experiment 3 were the same as 
those in Experiment 2 in Chapter 3 (see Material in Experiment 2), 8 positive, 8 negative 
primes and 8 neutral primes as priming stimuli, and a set of 48 positive and 48 negative 
adjectives as target (complete lists of primes and target are shown in Appendix 7 and 8). 
Apparatus: This was the same as Experiment 2, the emotional priming task was 
run on a BBC model B Microcomputer. The sequence of fields consisted of a prime display 
of 300 ms followed by a duration of either 300 or 1700 ms (i.e., 500 or 2000 ms SOA), 
and target display. A target adjective was presented and remained on screen until the 
subject pressed either "yes" or "no" key to indicate whether or not it applied to themselves. 
The programme automatically recorded reaction times and key choices. 
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Design: A within-subjects design was used; two durations of SOA (either 500 or 
2000 ms), three valences of primes (positive, negative or neutral), and two types of target 
adjective (positive or negative). Thus, there were 12 conditions and each set of positive and 
negative adjectives was carefully divided into each of 6 groups (total 12 groups, 8 
adjectives in a group) and allocated to each condition. There were 2 combinations of the 
adjective groups and the conditions to be counterbalanced (complete lists of the adjective 
groups and the allocation into the conditions in Appendix 9). Each of the 16 primes and 8 
no-prime controls was presented four times and paired with each of the two types of 
adjective at both SOAs to give a total of 96 trials. The SOA durations were presented in 
blocks (8 blocks) and the order of presentation of the blocks and the conditions (12 
conditions in a block) in each block was randomised. 
Procedure: The experiment was carried out in a quiet experimental laboratory. 
The procedure of this experiment was same as Experiment 3 except that the students 
subjects only participated in the emotional priming tasks not in the questionnaire based 
experiment. The emotional priming task was introduced by instructions displayed on a 
computer. The subjects were then presented with 16 practice trials and given feedback of 
their reactions on the screen showing that their reply was either "It applies to me" or "It 
does not apply to me". The practice trials were self-paced; the subjects pressed both keys 
to indicate readiness for the next trial. After the practice trials, the instructions were again 
presented and also indicated that the experimental trials would appear automatically rather 
than being self-paced. Then the first block was presented. There were eight blocks (12 
trials in a block) and after each block the subjects could have a rest until they pressed both 
buttons to indicate that they were ready to continue. It took about 13 minutes to complete. 
4.3 Results 
Overview: The analyses of the results will be presented in two main stages. First, 
the analyses of proportions of "yes" responses to the target adjectives across SOA and 
prime type. Second, the analyses of the mean reaction times for combined "yes" and "no" 
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responses will be presented, and then the mean reaction times for "yes" responses to 
positive adjectives and for "no" responses to negative adjectives will be separately 
considered to investigate self-esteem regulation more precisely. As mentioned in 
Experiment 2, since endorsement of the positive adjectives and rejection of the negative 
adjectives can be both regarded as self-esteem enhancement, the separate analyses of the 
mean reaction times for each type of response seems reasonable. 
Analyses of endorsement levels: Table 4.1 shows the mean of proportions of "yes" 
responses across both SOAs, three types of prime and both types of adjective. The analyses 
were carried out on SPSS for Windows. 
Table 4.1 
The mean proportion of "yes" responses (n=52) 
standard deviations are in brackets 
500 ms 2000 ms 
prime Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral 
Negative 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.25 
adjective (0.20) (0.25) (0.24) (0.28) (0.24) (0.21) 
Positive 0.69 0.82 0.69 0.69 0.73 0.83 
adjective (0.24) (0.20) (0.23) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23) 
These mean proportion of yes responses were analysed in a 2 (SOA: 500 ms vs. 
2000 ms) X 3 (Prime: negative vs. positive vs. neutral) x 2 (Adjective: negative vs. positive) 
analysis of variance with repeated measures for all variables. There was a main effect of 
Adjective [F(l , 51) = 136.12, p < .001]. There were also a two-way interaction of Prime x 
Adjective [F(2, 102) = 7.98, p < .005] and another two-way interaction of SOA x Prime 
[F(2, 102)= 14.26, p<.001]. 
It can be seen from Table 4.1 that the subjects endorsed more positive adjectives 
than negative adjectives at all levels; this would be expected in normal students. In addition, 
it is suggested by Table 4.2, that the endorsement rates were affected by the negative 
primes compared to the other types of prime. It seems that the subjects endorsed more 
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negative adjectives and less positive adjectives following the negative primes than following 
the positive or the neutral primes. 
Table 4.2 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses across Prime and Adjective, collapsed 
across SOA 
Negative prime Positive prime Neutral prime 
Negative adjective 0.33 0.26 0.26 
Positive adjective 0.69 0.78 0.76 
It can be also inferred from Table 4.3 that the positive primes facilitated the 
endorsements of the target adjectives at 500 ms SOA, whereas at 2000 ms SOA, the 
positive primes showed the opposite effect; they inhibited the endorsement of the target 
adjectives. 
Table 4.3 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses across SOA and Prime, collapsed across 
Negative prime Positive prime Control prime 
500 ms SOA 0.50 0.56 0.48 
2000 ms SOA 0.52 0.48 0.54 
However, the interactions of Prime x Adjective and SOA x Prime were qualified by 
a higher-order interaction of SOA x Prime x Adjective [F(2, 102) = 9.95, p < .001], further 
analyses were required to understand this three-way interaction. Since more positive 
adjectives were endorsed than the negative adjectives at all levels, the simple two-way 
interaction of SOA x Prime for each type of adjective valence was separately analysed (see 
Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2). 
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Fig. 4.1 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses to the negative adjectives across SOA and 
Prime 
In the case of negative adjectives, the interaction of SOA x Prime reached 
significance [F(2, 102) = 5.32, p < .01]. In order to understand this interaction, simple main 
effects were performed for each SOA and then for each prime separately. 
At 500 ms SOA, the main effect of Prime was not significant [F(2, 102) = .20, p = 
.820]. That is, there was no difference across the three types of prime in endorsing the 
negative adjectives at short SOA. However, at 2000 ms SOA, a significant simple main 
effect of Prime was found [F(2, 102) = 6.79, p < .005]. This was analysed by looking at the 
contrast terms which compared the three possible permutations of pairs of prime type. 
These contrasts showed that at 2000 ms SOA, the subjects rejected significantly less 
negative adjectives following the negative primes (0.36) than following both the positive 
(0.23) and the neutral primes (0.25) [F(l , 51) = 10.23, p < .005 ; F( l , 51) = 7.92, p < .01, 
respectively], however, the positive prime conditions did not differ from the neutral prime 
conditions [F(l , 51) = .53, p = .471]. 
In looking at the simple main effect of SOA, more negative adjectives were 
endorsed at 2000 ms SOA than at 500 ms SOA in the negative prime conditions [F(l , 51) 
= 7.32, p < .01]. To the contrary, in the positive prime conditions, more negative adjectives 
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were endorsed at 500 ms SOA than at 2000 ms SOA [F(l, 51) = 5.28, p < .05]. However, 
the effect of SOA disappeared in the neutral prime conditions [F(l , 51) = .60, p = .441]. 
The interaction of SOA x Prime for the positive adjectives was then analysed. This 
also reached significance [F(2, 102) = 20.40, p < .001], thus simple main effects were 
analysed out for each SOA and for each prime separately. 
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Fig. 4.2 
The mean proportions of "yes" responses to the positive adjectives across SOA and 
Prime 
At both 500 ms SOA and 2000 ms SOA, there was a significant simple main effect 
of Prime [F(2, 102) = 15.69, p < .001 ; F(2, 102) = 11.20, p < .001, respecdvely]. This was 
further analysed by looking at the contrast terms which compared the three possible 
permutations of pairs of prime type. At 500 ms SOA, the subjects endorsed significantly 
more positive adjectives following the positive primes than following both the negative and 
the neutral prime [F(l , 51) = 18.39, p < .001 ; F( l , 51) = 29.56, p < .001, respecfively], 
however, the other contrast term (negative prime vs. neutral prime) was not significant 
[F( l , 51) = .02, ps = .899]. At 2000 ms SOA, more posifive adjectives were endorsed 
following the neutral primes than both the negative and the positive primes [F(l , 51) = 
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25.53, p < .001 ; F ( l , 51) = 10.62, p < .005, respectively], however the other contrast 
terms (negative prime vs. positive prime) was not significant [F(l , 51) = 1.82, p = .184]. 
The simple main effects of SOA were then examined. Following the negative 
primes, there was no significant effect of SOA [F(l , 51) = .10, n.s.], however, following 
the neutral primes, more positive adjectives were endorsed at 2000 ms SOA than at 500 ms 
SOA [F(l , 51) = 27.65, p < .001]. In addition, contrary to the neutral prime conditions, 
more positive adjectives were endorsed at 500 ms SOA than at 2000 ms SOA following the 
positive primes [F(l , 51) = 7.27, p < .01]. 
In summary, at short SOA the positive primes increased the endorsement rates of 
the positive adjectives, showing a positive automatic facilitatory effect in normal subjects. 
However, for the negative adjectives, no Prime effects were found at short SOA. At long 
SOA, both the positive and the negative primes reduced the endorsement of the positive 
adjectives compared to the neutral primes. For the negative adjectives, the subjects 
accepted more negative adjectives following the negative primes than following either the 
positive or the neutral primes, which is an opposite finding to the previous studies (Power 
& Brewin, 1990; Power et al., 1991) where the normal subjects endorsed fewer negative 
adjectives following negative event primes at long SOA. 
Analyses of the mean reaction times (RT): The table below shows the mean 
reaction times for combined "yes" and "no" responses across both SOAs, three types of 
prime and both types of adjective. 
Table 4.4 
The mean reaction times for combined "yes" and "no" responses (n=52) 
standard deviations are on brackets 
500msec 2000msec 
prime Negative Positive Control Negative Positive Control 
Negative 1308.4 1294.6 1239.1 1330.7 1274.0 1198.5 
adjective (469.3) (497.4) (482.7) (617.9) (515.5) (426.0) 
Positive 1259.0 1096.8 1131.8 1301.7 1179.6 1066.0 
adjective (492.5) (376.3) (410.9) (593.7) (445.8) (365.5) 
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These mean reaction times for combined "yes" and "no" responses were analysed in 
a 2 (SOA: 500 ms vs. 2000 ms) x 3 (Prime: negative vs. positive vs. neutral) x 2 
(Adjective: negative vs. positive) analysis of variance with repeated measures for all 
variables. This overall AN OVA showed a significant main effect of Prime [F(2, 102) = 
12.89, p < .001] and another significant main effect of Adjective [F(l , 51) = 19.60, p < 
.001]. There were no effects of Prime. 
As can be seen in Table 4.4, it took longer to respond to the negative adjectives 
than to the positive adjectives. In addition, it seems that the subjects were slower in the 
negative prime conditions than in the positive and the neutral prime conditions. However, 
these main effects were qualified by a two-way interaction of Prime x Adjective [F(2, 102) 
= 3.45, p < .036], so the mean reaction times were collapsed across SOA and then the 
Prime x Adjective sub-ANOVA was carried out on these data (the data are shown in Table 
4.5 and Fig. 4.3). 
Table 4.5 
adjective Negative prime Positive prime Control prime mean 
Negative 1319.5 1284.3 1152.6 1252.1 
Positive 1280.4 1138.2 1098.9 1172.5 
mean 1300.0 1211.2 1125.7 
A simple main effect of Adjective indicated that the subjects took longer to respond 
to the negative adjectives than to the positive adjectives in all types of prime condition 
[negative prime: F( l , 51) = 19.79, p < .001 ; positive prime: F ( l , 51) = 30.39, p < .001 ; 
neutral prime: F( l , 51) = 10.14, p < .01]. 
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The mean reaction times across Prime and Adjective, collapsed across SOA 
To examine the simple main effect of Prime, the three possible permutations of pairs 
of prime type were analysed. It was found that in the case of the negative adjectives, the 
negative primes significantly increased the reaction times compared with the neutral primes 
[F( l , 51) = 6.94, p < .05], however the other contrast terms failed to reach significance. In 
the case of positive adjectives, a similar analysis showed that the negative primes again 
increased the reaction times compared with both positive and neutral primes [F(l , 51) = 
4.51, p < .05 ; F ( l , 51) = 11.02, p < .005, respectively]. That is, although the subjects took 
longer to respond to the negative adjectives than to the positive adjectives in all types of 
prime conditions, the negative primes increased the reaction times for both negative and 
positive adjectives. 
Analyses of RTs for "yes" and "no" responses separately: To examine self-
esteem regulation more carefully, the mean reaction times for "yes" responses to the 
positive adjectives and for "no" responses to the negative adjectives will be analysed 
separately. Since endorsement of the positive adjectives and rejection of the negative 
adjectives can be both regarded as self-esteem enhancement, these data would show how 
the subjects regulate their self-esteem in another way. 
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The reason why these particular responses were chosen for analysis is that the 
subjects endorsed few negative adjectives and rejected few positive adjectives (because 
they were healthy students). This makes the analyses of "yes" RTs to the negative 
adjectives and "no" RTs to the positive adjectives extremely difficult. If attempts were to 
be made to analyse such data, then the likelihood arises that there would be many empty 
cells in these conditions: thus the average of "yes" RTs to the negative adjectives and of 
"no" RTs to the positive adjectives might not produce reliable estimates. In the previous 
studies (Power & Brewin, 1990 ; Power, et al., 1991 ; Dalgleish, et al., 1995 ; Power, et 
al., 1996), the reaction times for "yes" responses to negative as well as positive adjectives 
were analysed. Because such analyses could possibly include many empty cells, it may be 
that the results are unrepresentative of the whole sample. 
There were however, in the present sample some subjects who endorsed the 
positive adjective relatively less and rejected the negative adjectives relatively less. 
Therefore, the more suitable 40 subjects from the 52 subjects were chosen for these 
analyses. First, the analyses of the mean reaction times for "yes" responses to the positive 
adjectives will be presented, and then for "no" responses to the negative adjectives will be 
presented. 
The mean reaction times for "yes" responses to positive adjectives across both 
SOAs and the three types of prime are shown in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 
Negative prime Positive prime Neutral prime 
500 ms 1176.6 1055.2 1006.7 
2000 ms 1260.5 1068.0 1033.8 
These mean reaction times for "yes" to positive adjectives were analysed in a 2 
(SOA: 500 ms vs. 2000 ms) x 3 (Prime: negative vs. positive vs. neutral) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures for all variables. The only significant result was a main 
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effect of Prime [F(2, 78) = 10.71, p < .001]. Comparing the three possible permutations of 
pairs of prime type, it was found that the subjects were slower to endorse the positive 
adjectives following the negative primes than following either the positive or the neutral 
primes [F(l , 39) = 11.40, p < .005 ; F( l , 39) = 12.99, p < .001, respectively], however 
there was no significant difference in the reaction times between the positive and the 
neutral prime conditions [F(l , 39) = 1.80, p = .187]. 
The mean reaction times for "no" responses to the negative adjectives across both 
SOAs and the three types of prime are shown in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 
Negative prime Positive prime Neutral prime 
500 ms 1271.8 1267.1 1273.4 
2000 ms 1211.8 1170.9 1184.4 
These mean reaction times for "no" to negative adjectives were analysed in a 2 
(SOA: 500 ms vs. 2000 ms) x 3 (Prime: negative vs. positive vs. neutral) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures for all variables. There was a main effect of SOA [F(l, 39) 
= 6.67, p < .05], that is, the subjects were slower to reject the negative adjectives at 500 ms 
SOA than at 2000 ms SOA. The other effects failed to reach significance. 
4.4 Discussion 
The present study examined whether the refined emotional priming task could 
provide a suitable approach to assess both automatic and controlled processes in normal 
student subjects. 
The subjects, not surprisingly, endorsed more positive adjectives than negative 
adjectives, but interestingly, the endorsement rates for each type of adjective was 
differently affected by the type of Prime and SOA. For the negative adjectives, no 
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automatic effects were found as it was predicted, however, for the positive adjectives, the 
positive primes increased the endorsement rates at short SOA. This is a positive automatic 
facilitatory effect which could reflect positive self-schemata. Conversely, at long SOA both 
the positive and the negative primes reduced the endorsement of the positive adjectives. In 
the case of the negative adjectives, however, the negative primes increased endorsement of 
the negative adjectives at long SOA, which was a non-replication of the findings from the 
previous studies where the normal subjects showed lower endorsement of the negative 
adjectives following the negative primes at long SOA. From these findings it could be 
concluded that normal individuals have positive self-schemata that produce positive 
automatic facilitatory effects and are not be damaged by accepting negative stimuh as self-
descriptive in hypothetical situations; indeed, they could become more critical about the self 
when negatively primed at long SOA. 
The analyses of the mean reaction times provided some support for the analyses of 
the endorsement rates and further implications. The subjects were slower to respond to 
both types of adjectives in the negative prime conditions than in the control prime 
conditions. In addition, the positive primes inhibited the reaction times for the positive 
adjectives. In any type of prime conditions, the subjects were slower to respond to the 
negative adjectives than to the positive adjectives. These findings suggest that the negative 
primes would affect the judgmental processes as can be assumed from the analyses of the 
endorsement rates, and also the judgmental processes for negative stimuli would be 
different from those for positive stimuli. To judge negative stimuh might require more 
controlled or complex processing which are regarded as "slow" processes. It might be the 
case that negative stimuli which are presented for judgement would have more impact than 
positive stimuli and prior information. In normal individuals, judgmental processes for 
negative stimuli would primarily depend on controlled processes, but in judgmental 
processes for positive stimuli, the controlled processes would not be dominant as much as 
in the processing of negative stimuli. Indeed, the mean reaction times for "yes" responses 
to the positive adjectives were inhibited by the negative primes, however, the mean RTs for 
"no" to the negative adjectives were not affected by any prime effects. Interestingly, the 
subjects took longer to reject the negative adjectives at short SOA than at long SOA, 
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which might be interpreted as suggesting that judgmental processes for these negative 
stimuli is different from simply processing information such as happens for the primes: 
when the negative target stimuU come up, individuals need to switch from processing the 
prior information (the primes) in order to process the new input. At short SOA, there is 
not enough time to turn off the processes for the primes, but at long SOA the processes for 
the primes are fading, thus it would quicker to switch another processes. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The present study examined the refined emotional priming paradigm. The findings 
indicate that this emotional priming task can assess both automatic and controlled 
processes. However, the previous studies (Power & Brewin, 1990 ; Power, et al., 1991) 
were not replicated by this study and also other implications have arisen. Therefore, new 
theoretical explanations for the emotional priming paradigm should be considered in 
addition to the possibility of extention for clinical use. 
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Chapter 5 Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 Overview of thesis 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine cognitive biases in people with delusions, 
especially to investigate the defensive function in deluded patients following the arguments 
of Bentall and his colleagues. To test the hypothesis that people with delusions would have 
defensive mechanisms, two different approaches were used and a new experimental 
methodology for this area of research was carefully considered. The results from each 
experiment will be summarised in turn in the next section. 
5.2 Summary of each chapter 
In Chapter 1, the selective review on cognitive biases in people with delusions was 
considered. It appeared to be reasonable to state that people suffering from delusions have 
abnormal cognitive biases in reasoning and information processing and these would be one 
of the most important key factors in understanding the nature and the mechanism of 
delusions. The findings are summarised that; deluded individuals have an attributional bias 
towards attributing negative outcomes to causes external to themselves; they exhibit an 
abnormal self-serving bias; these biases may reflect information processing biases for 
threatening materials. It has been argued that all the above cognitive biases would indicate 
a defensive function in deluded individuals, which would serve to protect themselves 
against feelings of low self-esteem. In order to investigate the defensive mechanism in 
deluded patients, some experimental tasks have been developed and it was suggested that 
the emotional priming paradigm which could potentially assess both automatic and 
controlled processes would provide a new approach for this area of research. 
In Chapter 2, the defensive attributional style was examined by comparing an 
explicit questionnaire (ASQ) and an implicit questionnaire (PIT). The results from this 
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experiment failed to replicate the previous study (Lyon, et al., 1994). For the ASQ, the 
results of the deluded subjects were unexpected. They did not show stable and global 
attributions for the negative events like depressives, and extemal attributions for the 
negative events like normals as claimed in the previous studies (Kaney & Bentall, 1989; 
Candido & Romney, 1990; Lyon, et al., 1994). Indeed, the deluded subjects were not 
different from the subjects in the depressed and the control groups. Problematically, on the 
ASQ, the depressed subjects did not make more internal and stable attributions for the 
negative events than did the normal subjects. Only on the globality scale, the depressed 
subjects showed more global attributions for the negative events compared with the control 
subjects. This is different from what would be normally expected for depressives. 
On the PIT, again the results did not replicate the previous study (Lyon, et al., 
1994). The deluded subjects showed higher self-serving bias scores than the depressed 
subjects and did not differ from the normal subjects. However, the deluded subjects 
showed similar responses to the depressed subjects for negative events; both the deluded 
and the depressed subjects scored more internal for the negative events than the control 
subjects. The PIT was expected to bypass the defensive function in deluded subjects, but 
these results suggest that the PIT still activates their defensive function in some ways. 
In Chapter 3, the defensive function in the deluded subjects was then investigated 
by the emotional priming paradigm. This emotional priming task was regarded as a 
promising experimental approach for this area of research. It was expected that at 
automatic processing level (at short SOA), the deluded subjects' responses would resemble 
those of the depressed subjects, whereas at controlled processing level (at long SOA) they 
would show similar responses to the normal subjects. However, the results from the 
present experiment were not positive. Although Group x SOA effects were found in the 
endorsement rates and the mean reaction times, differentiation between automatic and 
controlled processes could not be seen clearly across the groups. However, some results 
indicated that the deluded subjects have low self-esteem and the defensive mechanism to 
prevent themselves from entering negative feelings: the deluded subjects were slower to 
respond to the negative adjectives than to the positive adjectives; the deluded subjects were 
slower to reject the negative adjectives than the normal subjects. These could be 
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interpreted as suggesting that the deluded subjects need a greater degree of controlled 
processing with negative materials to protect themselves against feelings of low self-
esteem. 
Since the emotional priming paradigm unexpectedly failed to clearly assess both 
automatic and controlled processes in clinical groups in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3), it was 
then checked whether the emotional priming paradigm would still be a promising approach 
to assess both processes in a student population in Experiment 3 (Chapter 4). The results 
suggest that the emotional priming task can reflect both automatic and controlled processes 
but in a different manner from the suggestions made by the previous studies (Power & 
Brewin, 1990; Power, et al., 1991; Dalgleish, et al., 1995). At short SOAs, the subjects 
endorsed more positive adjectives following the positive primes than following the neutral 
primes. This is a positive automatic facilitatory effect which was not found in the previous 
studies (Power & Brewin, 1990; Power, et al., 1991; Dalgleish, et al., 1995; Power, et al., 
1996). However, on the mean reaction times for both combined and separated "yes" and 
"no" responses, the results seemed to be more complicated and could not be interpreted by 
automatic and controlled processes. These findings are consistent with the suggestion by 
Power et al. (1996), "...endorsement rates may provide a clearer measure of the effects of 
interest and may be less prone to the wider range of methodological and strategic effects 
that influence reaction time data in such tasks (p.9)." 
In next section, the two approaches used in this research will be more fully 
considered separately. 
5.3 Discussions on the two different approaches used in this research 
5.3.1 Questionnaire-based study (ASQ vs. PIT) 
As shown earlier, the results from using the ASQ and the PIT did not replicate the 
study of Lyon et al. (1994). One possible interpretation could be consistent with the 
suggestion by made Power (1991, cited in Power, et al., 1996). He suggested that self-
report cognitive measures might be less sensitive to current symptom levels than 
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experimental tasks. Nonetheless, self-report measures are still useful for clinical use 
because they are easy to administer as a part of therapy or assessment and no special 
equipment is required as in experimental tasks. Therefore, the attempt to assess both 
implicit (automatic) and explicit (controlled) response processes by self-report measures 
seems desirable. It seems especially difficult to develop self-report measures which can 
bypass explicit response processes, thus further research on the PIT is required. 
5.3.2 Experimental study (the emotional priming paradigm) 
From a different theoretical perspective, some studies employing the priming 
paradigm to investigate the processing of affect and emotion have been reported. In order 
to understand and interpret the results from the present research, it appears to be sensible 
to look at other priming paradigms related to the emotional priming paradigm. For 
example, Fazio et al. (1986) addressed the issue of whether affect could be activated 
automatically on the mere observation of an affect loaded stimulus. They used a priming 
procedure, in which the affective association between prime words and target words was 
manipulated. The prime words presented either positive (e.g., music), negative (e.g., death) 
or a string of three identical letters (e.g.., BBB) followed by a target word. The subjects 
were asked to evaluate whether the target word was "good" or "bad". It was found that 
response latencies to the target words were facilitated if both prime and target had the 
same valence (positive-positive or negative-negative: congruent pairs), but were inhibited if 
prime and target had the opposite valence (positive-negative or negative-positive: 
incongruent pairs) compared with the control trials (neutral-positive or neutral-negative: 
control pairs). These activation effects occurred only at 300 ms SOA, but disappeared at 
1000 ms SOA, suggesting that the observed effects of affective congruence should be 
attributed to automatic processes. Fazio et al. (1986) concluded that "affect can be 
activated automatically from memory in the same way that has been demonstrated 
previously for semantic knowledge (p.236)". 
Further research by Hermans et al. (1994) modified the procedure of the study of 
Fazio et al. (1986) and examined the affective priming effects found in Fazio et al.'s study 
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focusing on what conditions would be required to produce automatic affective activation. 
In Experiment 1 of Hermans et al.'s study, they chose colour pictures as both primes and 
targets instead of words. Hermans et al. (1994) tried to test "whether the affective priming 
effect is only confined to the affective processing of words, or whether it can be generalised 
towards other types of stimulus material (p.518)". The results showed that the study of 
Fazio et al. (1986) can be replicated even when complex visual stimuU were used. 
Facilitation was expected for the affectively congruent pairs and inhibition for the 
incongruent pairs in the comparison with the control pairs. Both facilitation and inhibition 
occurred only for 300 ms SOA condition. In Experiment 2, in order to investigate further 
whether or not the affective priming effect was dependent on an intentional, conscious 
evaluative process, they eliminated the explicit instructions to evaluate the target adjectives. 
The subjects were simply asked to read aloud the targets as quickly as possible. The 
subjects did not have to make judgements on the targets. It was found that "pronunciation 
latencies were longer for affectively incongruent trials, and were shorter for affectively 
congruent prime-target pairs (p.526)". Hermans et al. (1994) concluded that the automatic 
affective activation effect is independent of an evaluative processing goal (Experiment 2), 
or the verbal character of the stimuli (Experiment 1). They argued that these findings 
provide information about necessary conditions to produce the automatic activation of 
affective information in memory. 
Hermans et al.'s study lies in the Une of conditional approach to automaticity 
which was driven from the argument against the current consensus definition of 
automaticity (e.g., Bargh, 1992, 1989). In the 'traditional agreement' on cognitive 
processing, automatic processing is usually regarded as being fast, involuntary, 
unintentional, unconscious, effortless and outside awareness. However, Bargh (1992, 
1989) argued that the current consensus definition of automaticity continues to be a unitary 
concept that entails all the above characteristics in an all-or-none fashion. That is, under 
this dual-mode model of cognition, a cognitive process would be either automatic or 
controlled. Instead of this unitary concept of automaticity, the decomposition of 
automaticity has been suggested by several studies (e.g. Hermans, et al, 1994; Bargh, 1992, 
1989; Logan & Cowan, 1984). It is argued that the defining features do not all occur in an 
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all-or-none fashion, but rather seem to be likely to co-occur as combinations of different 
features (e.g. Hermans, et al, 1994; Bargh, 1992, 1989; Logan & Cowan, 1984). For 
example, a process might be intentional but effortless. This approach makes the researchers 
investigate the preconditions that are needed to have the automatic process occur, as we 
have seen the study of Hermans et al. (1994). Then the varieties of automaticity can be 
classified with respect to their necessary preconditions (Bargh, 1992, 1989). As a 
consequence, cognitive processing does not seem so simple as unitary concept of 
automaticity, rather, it may be required to classify the varieties of automaticity according to 
the preconditions. 
As we have seen, according to Bargh's arguments (1992, 1989), the characteristic 
of automatic processing is conditional; in order to produce automatic processing, the 
necessary preconditions should be considered. In the present research, the emotional 
priming paradigm was chosen to assess automatic and controlled processes in people with 
delusions. However, a possibility arises that the preconditions required to produce 
automatic processing in deluded patients might be different from those in normal 
individuals. Recalling the hypothesis on cognitive biases in people with delusions; deluded 
patients would show negative self-concept when they are unaware of being assessed about 
the self, whereas deluded patients would show self-defensive function when directiy asked 
to evaluate about the self. The emotional priming paradigm actually requires overt 
evaluations about the self at both short and long SOAs. While a prime might bias at short 
SOAs, it would follow that the requirement to make an overt self evaluative decision might 
make it difficult to bypass the defensive function of deluded patients could not be bypassed. 
For people with delusions, being independent of evaluation about the self would be an 
important precondition for automatic processing to occur. This precondition may not apply 
to normal individuals, since positive automatic facilitatory effects on self-evaluating tasks 
were found in the normal subjects in Chapter 4. From the results of this research it can be 
suggested that simple pronunciation of target adjectives, as in Hermans et al.'s Experiment 
2, seems to be a more appropriate procedure for investigating automatic processing in 
deluded patients. 
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I f the preconditions for automatic processes are considered, the emotional priming 
paradigm might become properly sensitive and employ appropriate methodology. 
Furthermore, the emotional priming paradigm could be extended to other psychiatric 
patients where it would be useful to understand both their automatic and controlled 
cognitive processing. For example, some studies were carried out to understand both 
automatic and controlled processing in anxious patients (Dalgleish, et al., 1995) and in 
remitted manic patients (Winters & Neale, 1985). 
5.4 Conclusions 
Cognitive biases, particularly the defensive mechanism in people with delusions was 
investigated in two different methodologies in this thesis. The results partly supported the 
hypothesis of the defensive function in patients suffering from delusions; on the PIT the 
deluded patients showed higher internal scores for negative events than the normal 
subjects, in the emotional priming task they were slower to respond to the negative 
adjectives than to the positive adjectives, and also slower to reject the negative adjectives 
than the normal subjects. The results suggested that the emotional priming paradigm would 
be a potential approach to focus on assessing both automatic and controlled processes in 
psychiatric groups. However, further research should be required to refine the emotional 
priming paradigm with respect to the preconditions required for automatic processing in 
deluded patients. 
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Appendix 1: The Attributional Style Questionnaire. 
A.S.O. 
NAME: 
DATE: 
DIRECTIONS 
Please read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you. 
Decide what you believe would be the major cause of the situation if it happened to you. 
Write this cause in the blank provided. 
Answer three questions about the cause. Circle only one number per question. 
Go to the next question. 
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YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO COMPLIMENTS YOU ON YOUR APPEARANCE. 
Write down the one major cause 
1. Is the cause of your friend's compliment due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
2. In the future when you are with your friend, will this cause again be present? 
Wil l never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
3. Is the cause something that just affects interacting with your friends or does it also 
influence other areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
YOU HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A JOB UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR SOME TIME. 
Write down the one major cause 
4. Is the cause of your unsuccessful job search due to something about you or 
something about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
5. In the future when looking for a job, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
6. Is the cause something that just influences looking for a job or does it also 
influence other areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
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YOU BECOME VERY RICH. 
Write down the one major cause. 
7. Is the cause of your becoming rich due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
8. In your financial future, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
9. Is the cause something that just affects obtaining money or does it also influence 
other areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
A FRIEND COMES TO YOU WITH A PROBLEM AND YOU DON'T TRY TO HELP 
THEM. 
Write down the one major cause 
10. Is the cause of not helping your friend due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances ? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
11. In the future when a friend comes to you with a problem, will this cause again be 
present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
12. Is the cause something that just affects what happens when a friend comes to you 
with a problem or does it also influence other areas of your life ? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
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YOU GIVE AN IMPORTANT TALK IN FRONT OF A GROUP AND THE 
AUDIENCE REACTS NEGATIVELY. 
Write down the one major cause 
13. Is the cause of the audience reacting negatively due to something about you or 
something about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
14. In the future when giving talks, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
15. Is the cause something that just influences giving talks or does it also influence 
other areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
YOU DO A PROJECT WHICH HIGHLY PRAISED. 
Write down the one major cause 
16. Is the cause of being praised due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances ? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
17. In the future when doing a project, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
18. Is the cause something that just affects doing projects or does it also influence 
other areas of your life ? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
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YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO ACTS HOSTILELY TOWARDS YOU. 
Write down the one major cause 
19. Is the cause of your friend acting hostile due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
20. In the future when interacting with your friends, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
21. Is the cause something that just influences interacting with your friends or does it 
also influence other areas of your life ? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
YOU CAN'T GET ALL THE WORK DONE THAT OTHERS EXPECT OF YOU. 
Write down the one major cause 
22. Is the cause of your not getting the work done due to something about you or 
something about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
23. In the future when doing the work that others expect, will this cause again be 
present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
24. Is the cause sorhething that just affects doing work that others expect of you or 
does it also influence other areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my hfe 
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YOUR SPOUSE (BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND) HAS BEEN TREATING YOU MORE 
LOVINGLY. 
Write down the one major cause 
25. Is the cause of your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) treating you more lovingly due to 
something about you or something about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
2. In future interaction with your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend), will this cause again 
be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
3. Is the cause something that just affects how your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) 
treats you or does it also influence other areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
YOU APPLY FOR A POSITION THAT YOU WANT VERY BADLY (e.g., 
IMPORTANT JOB, GRADUATE SCHOOL ADMISSION.) etc., AND YOU GET IT. 
Write down the one major cause 
4. Is the cause of your getting the position due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
5. In the future when applying for a position, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
6. Is the cause something that just influences applying for a position or does it also 
influence other areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
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YOU GO OUT WITH SOMEONE AND IT GOES BADLY. 
Write down the one major cause 
1. Is the cause of the outing going badly due to something about you or something 
about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
2. In future outings, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
3. Is the cause something that just influences outings or does it also influence other 
areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
YOU GET A PAY RISE. 
Write down the one major cause. 
4. Is the cause of your getting a raise due to something about you or something about 
other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totally due to me 
people or circumstances 
5. In the future on your job, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Will always be present 
present 
6. Is the cause something that just affects getting a raise or does it also influence 
other areas of your life? 
Influences just this 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influences all situations 
particular situation in my life 
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Appendix 2: Anglicised version of the Pragmatic Inference Test. 
12 vignette and the questions for each vignette. 
A. You decide to open your own dry cleaning shop in a small but growing town near the 
border. Your shop will be the only one of its kind for miles around. In the first year of 
business, the town's population doubles and your business prospers. Your advertising 
campaign is a big success and reactions from your customers indicate that the cleaning is of 
good quality. Your gross sales exceed expectations. You wonder whether it would be to 
your advantage to open a chain of shops, so you go to a bank and apply for a loan. As you 
hoped, the bank approves the loan. 
B. You have been looking unsuccessfully for a job as a factory worker. The unemployment 
rate has risen lately, and jobs are especially tight in your field. Sales have been hurt because 
of foreign competition. You decide to talk to a friend about the situation. He reminds you 
that you have had difficulties with management in the past because of being late and a poor 
performance record. Your search for a job is frustrating and you go for six months without 
finding a job. 
C. You pride your self on your appearance. You recently spent some money on new cloths 
and a new hair style. The next day you receive a number of compliments at work, especially 
from one colleague. However, this person angers you later on in the day, by asking you a 
lift home. This is a great inconvenience because this person lives quite distance from your 
destination. 
D. A neighbour mentions to you that their teenager had a drinking problem. You wonder if 
the neighbour is going to ask you for advice. This neighbour is an independent and 
headstrong person who rarely seeks advice from others. You are uncomfortable because 
you do not have any children of your own and you are not very good at counselling people. 
The neighbour leaves without asking for your advice. 
E. You and a colleague decide to go our one night for a bite to eat. You wonder whether 
you will have a good time since your colleague is a moody person. The night stars out 
badly when you forget to call a taxi for both of you and you also fail to make dinner 
reservations. You and the colleague wait for an hour at the restaurant and there is still no 
table. You both decide to go elsewhere for a meal. The food and service are unsatisfying at 
the other place, especially for the colleague. On the trip home the colleague asks you a lot 
of questions how you were able to receive a recent promotion from the boss, and mentions 
that no one else in the office has received a promotion in over two years. The questioning 
indicates a hostile tone. 
F. You have a date with somebody new. You go to a film and your date has a poor 
opinion of it. And for most of the evening, your date does not say much. You also do not 
initiate much conversation, and when you do talk you have a difficult time keeping up your 
end of the conversation. When the evening is over, your date expresses disappointment 
about how the evening went. 
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G. A lonely, elderly person sits next to you on a park bench while you are reading a book 
and begins to talk to you. You are not surprised by this, since strangers are often friendly 
towards you. After some small talk, you find out this person is down on their luck and 
needs help. You and the person talk for some time, and it seems to you that this person 
continues to enjoy your company. 
H. The company you work for is always busy around holiday time. It is the day before 
Christmas holiday and everyone in the office is exhausted. At short notice you decide to 
throw an office party. You prepare an interesting mix of gin and fruit punch, which draws a 
number of compliments from others. Everyone seems to enjoy themselves. You make 
friends with a couple of new colleagues and everyone laughs at your jokes. 
I . You give an important talk on a controversial topic to a group of town residents. You 
present a point of view that in the short term in unpopular but will likely benefit the town in 
the long run. The audience reacts negatively, especially to your suggestion that the town 
ought to purchase more lorries. The next speaker presents a point of view that is opposite 
to your own. As you listen to the speech, you notice that this person is a very fluent and 
persuasive speaker. It becomes quite obvious to you that the second speaker receives a 
positive reaction from the audience. 
J. Recently, you have not done all the work that your boss expects of you. The boss begins 
to complain about your performance. The job is sometimes difficult because it is quite 
technical and the hours are a burden. Also, you recentiy discover through the office 
grapevine that the boss' nephew is very interested in your position. 
K. You take a college course in English Literature because you like to write. One of your 
assignments is to write a paper on one famous English author. You choose John Fowles, a 
decision which is met with praise by the teacher who is a great fan of Fowles. The teacher 
tells you that Fowles is perhaps the most influential writer. You work hard on the paper 
and think it is well written. You are pleased when the paper is returned. The teacher 
comments that your interpretation of Fowles' work is consistent with her own, and you 
receive an excellent mark. 
L. You recently receive a salary increase at work. While you are a bit surprised by this 
since you had no prior notice about such a raise, you do feel you have been a reliable 
worker. Indeed, others have received wage increases in the past when you did not. The day 
after receive this news, a memo is sent to all workers indicating in the last few months a 
number of employees have voluntarily left the company. The company's owner offers to be 
sensitive to suggestions to improving job satisfaction. 
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The questions for vignette A; 
A 1. What kind of shop do you open? 
A. Hardware. 
B. Dry cleaning. 
A 2. In what part of the country is the town located? 
A. Birmingham. 
B. Cariisle. 
A 3. Where is the loan obtained? 
A. A finance company. 
B. Bank. 
A 4. What is the reason for the success of your business? 
A. You are a clever businessman. 
B. You had no competition. 
The questions for vignette B; 
B 1. Why do you discuss your situation with a friend? 
A. Need advice. 
B. Your friend is recruiting staff. 
B 2. How long do you go for without finding work? 
A. Six weeks. 
B. Six months. 
B 3. Why do you have trouble finding work? 
A. Poor job record. 
B. Poor job market. 
B 4. What kind of job interests you? 
A. A big company. 
B. A small company. 
The questions for vignette C; 
C 1. Why do you receive a compliment from your colleague? 
A. Your appearance is genuinely perceived as worthy of a compliment. 
B. This person needs a favour from you. 
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C 2. Why do you spend money on your appearance? 
A. Self pride. 
B. You enj oy compliments. 
C 3. Who gives you die most compliments at work? 
A. Same sexed people. 
B. Opposite sexed people. 
C 4. On what do you spend your money? 
A. Shoes. 
B. Hair style. 
The questions for vignette D; 
D 1. Who comes to you for advice? 
A: Colleague. 
B. Neighbour. 
D 2. What is the nature of the problem? 
A. Stealing. 
B. Drinking. 
D 3. What gender is the person with the problem? 
A. Male. 
B. Female. 
D 4. Why doesn't the neighbour ask you for advice? 
A. This person is the type not to ask for advice. 
B. You are inexperienced in this area. 
The questions for vignette E; 
E 1. Where do you and the colleague go? 
A. To a fi lm. 
B. To a restaurant. 
E 2. At what time of day does the activity take place? 
A. Afternoon. 
B. Evening. 
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E 3. Why does the colleague act hostilely towards you? 
A. The person is jealous of you. 
B. The person is angry that you forgot to call a taxi and make dinner 
reservations. 
E 4. Who initiates the activity? 
A. You. 
B. The colleague. 
The questions for vignette F; 
F 1. With whom do you have a date? 
A. A close friend. 
B. A new acquaintance. 
F 2. Where do you go on the date? 
A. To a fi lm. 
B. For dinner. 
F 3. Why does the date go badly? 
A. Your date was a boring person. 
B. You were not interesting enough for the person. 
F 4. Where did you go after the date? 
A. For a drive. 
B. Nowhere. 
The questions for vignette G; 
G 1. Who starts the conversation with you? 
A. A tourist. 
B. A stranger. 
G 2. Why does this person talk with you for so long. 
A. You are friendly. 
B. This person wants your help. 
G 3. What are you doing when you are approached by this individual? 
A. Reading a newspaper. 
B. Reading a book. 
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G 4. Why is this person down on their luck? 
A. Illness. 
B. Deserted by family. 
The questions for vignette H; 
H 1. Why is the party a success? 
A. Your colleagues are in the mood to unwind. 
B. You know how to throw a good party. 
H 2. What is piopular at the party? 
A. The drink. 
B. The food. 
H 3. At what time of year is the party? 
A. Christmas. 
B. Summer. 
H 4. Is the party well attended? 
A. Yes. 
B. No. 
The questions for vignette I ; 
11. Where do you give the speech? 
A. A political convention. 
B. A town hall meeting. 
12. Why does the audience react negatively to your speech? 
A. You were an ineffective speaker. 
B. The second speaker took the less controversial viewpoint. 
13. How do you learn about the audience's reaction to the second speaker? 
A. Someone tells you. 
B. You witness it. 
14. What is being discussed at the meeting? 
A. Road repair. 
B. Rubbish removal. 
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The questions for vignette J; 
J 1. With whom do you talk about your problems at work? 
A. No one. 
B. Your spouse. 
J 2. What kind of skill does this job require? 
A. Manual. 
B. Technical. 
J 3. Why does your boss complain about your work performance? 
A. You have poor technical skills. 
B. The boss wants you to leave to make room for a relative. 
J 4. What shift do you work? 
A. Day. 
B: Night. 
The questions for vignette K; 
K 1. What kind of course do you take? 
A. English Literature. 
B. Writing course. 
K 2. Why do you take the course? 
A. Compulsory. 
B. Pleasure. 
K 3. Why does the teacher like your paper? 
A. You are a good writer. 
B. Your viewpoints are similar to the teachers. 
K 4. Why do you choose to write about Fowles? 
A. He is your favourite author. 
B. The teacher tells you to. 
The questions for vignette L; 
L 1. What type of income raise do you receive? 
A. Bonus payment. 
B. Wage increase 
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L 2. How do you hear about the raise? 
A. A memo. 
B. Told personally. 
L 3. Why do you get the raise? 
A. Company wants to prevent further resignations. 
B. You deserve the raise because of good performance. 
L 4. Who else gets a raise? 
A. No one. 
B. Everyone. 
93 
Appendix 3: Description of subjects in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Diagnosis in/out-patient sex age MART 
S1 schizoaffective disorder in F 61 97 
S2 schizopfirenic in M 31 100 
S3 schizophrenic in M 29 107 
S4 delusional disorder in M 42 114 
S5 schizophrenic out F 51 119 
S6 schizophrenic out F 43 102 
S7 bipolar disorder with psychotic features out F 37 98 
S8 schizophrenic in M 51 105 
S9 schizoaffective disorder in F 28 96 
S10 schizophrenic out M 57 116 
S11 schizophrenic out F 43 107 
D1 major depression in M 54 109 
D2 depression + anxiety out F 30 115 
D3 major depression out F 27 112 
D4 major depression in M 38 103 
D5 major depression in M 61 100 
D6 depression + anxiety out F 49 116 
D7 major depression in F 34 116 
D8 major depression in M 29 112 
D9 major depression out F 42 112 
D10 major depression out M 32 109 
D11 major depression in F 34 100 
N1 normal subject F 46 99 
N2 normal subject M 42 111 
N3 normal subject M 48 120 
N4 normal subject F 28 115 
N5 normal subject M 54 110 
N6 normal subject F 48 91 
N7 normal subject F 57 98 
N8 normal subject M 30 120 
N9 normal subject F 61 125 
N10 normal subject M 53 121 
N11 nonnal subject F 44 118 
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Appendix 4: Each subject's scores on the Attributional Style Questionnaire. 
maximum score for each sub-scale: 42 
minimum score for each sub-scale: 6 
positive event negative event 
internality stability giobality internality stability giobality 
Deluded S1 31 40 33 25 34 32 
S2 21 21 33 24 21 30 
S3 35 35 26 30 27 20 
S4 15 34 29 13 26 21 
S5 40 32 35 31 25 22 
S6 34 30 38 27 21 34 
S7 24 30 36 30 24 30 
S8 39 28 24 28 21 25 
S9 33 30 17 36 28 30 
S10 33 33 27 30 28 27 
S11 24 15 29 34 14 28 
Depressed D1 39 37 40 27 38 42 
D2 27 30 23 28 27 21 
D3 31 31 28 24 27 37 
D4 33 33 29 26 30 36 
D5 37 39 36 37 27 24 
D6 33 26 30 36 31 37 
D7 30 31 33 30 25 29 
D8 18 23 24 21 23 21 
D9 27 33 25 36 28 31 
D10 26 27 26 26 27 26 
D11 32 36 36 36 36 36 
Normal N1 30 29 18 19 19 12 
N2 29 32 28 18 27 18 
N3 25 34 28 19 28 24 
N4 33 30 31 35 24 20 
N5 38 34 29 38 30 20 
N6 36 34 26 22 29 19 
N7 12 42 24 12 42 24 
N8 27 30 24 28 25 20 
N9 33 25 26 31 25 16 
N10 30 26 31 32 28 31 
N11 33 35 36 23 28 28 
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Appendix 5: Eacli subject's scores on the Pragmatic Inference Test. 
maximum score for each sub-scale: 6 
minimum score for each sub-scale: 0 
self-serving bias score: subtracting score for negative event from score for positive 
event 
Internality 
positive 
event 
negative 
event 
self-
serving 
bias 
Deluded SI 4 4 0 
S2 4 2 2 
S3 3 3 0 
S4 3 2 1 
S5 4 4 0 
S6 3 3 0 
S7 6 4 2 
S8 4 5 -1 
S9 3 2 1 
S10 3 4 -1 
S11 4 3 1 
Depressed D1 5 4 1 
D2 3 3 
D3 2 1 1 
D4 2 3 -1 
D5 1 4 -3 
D6 2 3 -1 
D7 2 3 -1 
D8 3 4 -1 
D9 3 3 0 
D10 1 3 -2 
D11 1 3 -2 
Normal N1 4 4 0 
N2 3 2 1 
N3 1 2 -1 
N4 3 1 2 
N5 2 1 1 
N6 2 1 1 
N7 1 4 -3 
N8 3 3 0 
N9 2 2 0 
N10 2 3 -1 
N i l 3 2 1 
96 
Appendix 6: The Word Intensity List. 
Word Intensity 
On the following page there is a list of adjectives. Please rate how strong the feeling is that each 
word conveys to you on a scale from one to three. So if you think that the adjective is fairly mild, 
put a 1 in the brackets just to the left of the word. If you think that the adjective conveys a medium 
amount of feeling, put a 2 in the brackets. If you think that the adjective is very strong in feeling, 
please out a 3 beside it. Try to give your immediate reaction to each adjective rather than diinking 
hard about the decision. 
(rating: 1= mild, 2= average, 3= intense) 
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•—uptight 
—fearful 
•—restless 
•—upset 
•—tense 
—scared 
—uneasy 
—nervous 
—desperate 
—frightened 
—anxious 
—troubled 
—worried 
—confused 
—afraid 
—shy 
—jittery 
—panicky 
—jumpy 
—insecure 
—shaky 
—disorganised 
-terrified 
-unloved 
-apathetic 
-unlucky 
—downcast 
-gloomy 
—forlorn 
—tormented 
—worthless 
—inhibited 
-unwanted 
—unpopular 
-pessimistic 
-inferior 
—resigned 
-depressed 
-miserable 
-bored 
-hopeless 
-ashamed 
-useless 
-ugly 
-unfortunate 
-lonely 
-abandoned 
-unhappy 
-guilty 
-tragic 
-rejected 
-sad 
-isolated 
-hurt 
-lost 
-unsociable 
-enraged 
-discontented 
—vexed 
—resentful 
-—irritable 
—disgusted 
-—outraged 
—stormy 
—-furious 
-—cruel 
—hostile 
—-violent 
—angry 
-—cross 
—-critical 
-—mean 
—impohte 
-—devious 
-—heardess 
—insincere 
-—dishonest 
—indecisive 
-—unkind 
-—thoughtless 
-—unreUable 
-—selfish 
-—lazy 
•—irresponsible 
-—impatient 
-—cold 
•—deceitful 
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Appendix 7: Priming stimuli in the Emotional Priming Paradigm 
Negative Primes Positive Primes 
1. Your family rejects you. 
2. Your work is criticised. 
3. Others control your life. 
4. Your life i f failure. 
5. A close friend dies. 
6. You lose your job. 
7. A loved one leaves you. 
8. You fail an interview. 
1. A date goes well. 
2. Your work is praised. 
3. You make new friends 
4. You pass an important test. 
5. Your family encourages you. 
6. You get a good job. 
7. A close friend moves nearly. 
8. You attain a lifelong goal. 
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Appendix 8: Target adjectives in the Emotional Priming Paradigm. 
Negative adjectives 
N-1 N-2 N-3 
block 
1 Angry Greedy Nervous 
2 Uneasy Anxious Isolated 
3 Ashamed Unloved Stubborn 
4 Worried Cautious Miserable 
5 Unwanted Troubled Frightened 
6 Restless Depressed Jumpy 
7 Heartless Indecisive Gloomy 
8 Inadequate Empty Awkward 
N-4 N-5 N-6 
block 
1 Confused Restless Unreliable 
2 Helpless Suspicious Upset 
3 Impatient Timid Unkind 
4 Unsociable Lonely Unhappy 
5 Tense Unlucky Fearful 
6 Guilty Selfish Critical 
7 Useless Insecure Rejected 
8 Hostile Negative Worthless 
Positive adjectives 
P-1 P-2 P-3 
block 
1 Alert Loving Patient 
2 Gentle Gifted Fearless 
3 Strong Helpful Talented 
4 Capable Cheerful Confident 
5 Carefree Sensible Optimistic 
6 Reliable Competent Loyal 
7 Assertive Dependable Modest 
8 Attractive Happy Bright 
P-4 P-5 P-6 
block 
1 Friendly Tolerant Respected 
2 Creative Important Successful 
3 Fulfilled Productive Witty 
4 Perceptive Smart Honest 
5 Lucky Tender Mature 
6 Polite Lively Sincere 
7 Clever Relaxed Generous 
8 Popular Sociable Truthful 
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Appendix 9: The combinations of each type of target adjective and the conditions in 
the Emotional Priming Task. 
Appendix 9-1 
SOA 500 ms 2000 ms 
prime Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral 
combination 1 N-1 N-2 N-3 N-4 N-5 N-6 
combination 2 N-6 N-4 N-5 N-3 N-1 N-2 
Appendix 9-2 
SOA 500 ms 2000 ms 
prime Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral 
combination 1 P-1 P-2 P-3 P-4 P-5 P-6 
combination 2 P-6 P-4 P-5 P-3 P-1 P-2 
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Appendix 10: Each subject's endorsement rate for each type of target adjective in 
Experiment 2. 
Appendix 10-1 
The endorsement rates of Negative adjectives in Experiment 2. 
500 ms 2000 ms 
negative positive neutral negative positive neutral 
Deluded S1 0.50 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.25 0.00 
S2 0.25 0.38 0.13 0.38 0.25 0.25 
S3 0.50 0.38 0.63 0.75 0.38 0.38 
S4 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.25 
S5 0.38 0.25 0.63 0.50 0.75 0.50 
S6 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.25 
S7 0.13 0.63 0.25 0.63 0.13 0.50 
S8 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.88 
S9 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.13 
S10 0.38 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.88 0.63 
S11 0.50 0.13 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.75 
Depressed D1 0.25 0.63 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 
D2 0.63 0.25 0.38 0.63 0.25 0.13 
D3 0.25 0.38 0.38 0.13 0.13 0.25 
D4 0.88 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.63 0.75 
D5 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.75 
D6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 
D7 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.88 
D8 0.75 0.63 0.63 0.88 0.50 0.88 
D9 0.88 1.00 0.63 0.75 0.88 0.75 
D10 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.88 
D11 0.63 0.88 6.63 1.00 0.88 0.75 
Normal NT 0.25 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.50 
N2 0.63 6.13 6.25 0.63 0.00 0.13 
N3 0.13 0.38 6.38 0.50 0.38 0.38 
N4 0.63 0.88 0.63 0.38 0.75 0.50 
N5 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.25 
N6 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.13 
N7 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.13 . 0.00 0.00 
N8 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.25 
N9 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.38 0.75 
N10 0.00 d'.oO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
N11 0.13 0.13 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.50 
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Appendix 10-2 
The endorsement rates of Positive adjectives in Experiment 2. 
negative 
500 ms 
positive neutral negative 
2000 ms 
positive neutral 
Deluded SI 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.38 0.75 0.75 
S2 0.38 1.00 0.63 0.63 0.63 1.00 
S3 0.63 1.00 0.75 0.13 0.75 1.00 
S4 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.63 0.75 1.00 
S5 0.63 0.88 0.38 0.75 0.88 0.50 
S6 0.75 0.88 1.00 0.88 0.75 0.88 
S7 0.50 0.38 0.63 0.50 0.63 0.88 
S8 0.88 0.63 0.88 0.75 0.63 0.63 
S9 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.88 0.88 
S10 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.38 0.38 0.50 
S11 0.88 0.75 0.38 0.63 0.50 0.88 
Depressed D1 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.88 
02 0.13 0.63 0.63 0.38 0.38 0.88 
D3 0.88 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 
D4 0.50 0.63 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.63 
•5 0.50 0.88 0.50 0.50 0.88 0.50 
D6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
D7 0.63 0.63 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.25 
D8 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.38 0.38 0.50 
D9 0.88 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.75 0.75 
D10 0.13 0.00 d.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 
D11 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.63 0.25 0.50 
Normal N1 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.63 0.88 
N2 0.25 0.88 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 
N3 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.63 0.88 0.75 
N4 0.63 0.75 0.38 0.50 0.63 0.88 
N5 0.63 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.88 
N6 0.75 0.88 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 
N7 0.88 0.88 T.OO 0.88 0.75 1.00 
N8 0.63 0.75 0.88 0.63 0.75 0.75 
N9 0.63 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.63 0.88 
N10 1.00 0.75 0.63 0.75 0.63 0.88 
N i l 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.88 0.88 1.00 
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Appendix 11: Each subject's mean reaction times for each type of target adjective in 
Experiment 2. 
Appendix 11-1 
The mean reaction times for Negative adjectives in Experiment 2. 
negative 
500 ms 
positive neutral negative 
2000 ms 
positive neutral 
Deluded SI 2480 1877 1572 2082 2181 2260 
S2 1228 1123 932 1272 1271 1083 
S3 1854 1986 1315 1873 1249 1511 
S4 2077 1707 1543 1677 1470 1672 
S5 2464 3055 2593 2697 3169 2815 
S6 1654 1530 1419 1688 2047 1950 
S7 1329 1369 1419 1442 1371 1389 
S8 1514 1470 1623 1595 1571 1185 
S9 3236 2455 1903 3341 4426 2894 
S10 2331 2131 1834 2152 2751 2218 
S11 2940 3538 2990 2930 3132 2803 
Depressed D1 2490 2792 3016 2369 2962 2931 
D2 2055 1908 1989 1928 2061 1697 
D3 1262 1845 1416 1295 1381 1392 
D4 1644 2491 1170 1501 1963 1101 
D5 1429 1587 1173 1786 2187 1693 
D6 1368 1316 1946 1084 910 1424 
D7 1835 1998 1595 1535 2093 1391 
D8 1012 1165 1182 898 1109 1027 
D9 1339 1590 1063 1154 1358 949 
D10 2251 1398 1401 1429 2116 2141 
D11 1749 1506 1333 1467 1544 1533 
Normal N1 1557 1399 959 1514 1561 1314 
N2 1986 1676 1671 1850 1480 1479 
N3 1720 1558 1741 1658 2702 1711 
N4 1292 1112 1498 1194 1340 1658 
N5 1331 1402 1206 1362 1352 1171 
N6 1436 1196 2162 1774 1543 1454 
N7 1308 1485 1222 1314 1197 1069 
N8 2340 2078 2347 1997 2039 1754 
N9 1425 2578 1407 1358 1478 1433 
NIC 954 722 773 801 937 908 
Ni l 2362 2974 2358 2457 2024 2367 
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Appendix 11-2 
The mean reaction times for Positive adjectives in Experiment 2. 
negative 
500 ms 
positive neutral negative 
2000 ms 
positive neutral 
Deluded S1 2134 1945 1888 1924 2788 1817 
S2 1175 1112 984 862 844 907 
S3 1963 1098 1107 1229 1496 1043 
S4 1290 1540 2345 1736 1749 1371 
S5 2947 2097 2710 2648 2433 1709 
S6 1757 1878 1829 1264 1888 1347 
S7 1356 -1426 1202 1542 1317 1340 
S8 1456 1764 1364 1788 1509 1598 
S9 1916 2004 1414 2891 1590 1644 
S10 2030 2052 2342 2482 2064 2246 
S11 2762 3256 2460 2765 2914 2329 
Depressed D1 1942 1715 2376 2422 2795 1952 
D2 2062 1610 1620 2241 1724 1543 
D3 1146 1005 1046 1012 936 962 
D4 1728 1917 . 1620. 1640 . 1691 1197 
D5 2205 1805 1849 2262 2168 2331 
D6 1003 1039 1354 1040 1125 1677 
D7 1617 2180. 1981 1491 1698 1732 
D8 969 1049 1032 1220 1053 904 
D9 1232 1443 1153 1418 1510 1213 
D16 2312 1138 1548 2101 2021 1954 
D11 1814 1425 1429 1656 1553 1418 
Normal N1 1813 1065 1642 1485 1320 968 
N2 1766 1620 1403 1681 1523 1359 
N3 1887 1417 1570 1515 2030 1682 
N4 935 1148 1175 1095 1082 1113 
N5 1312 1035 860 1078 1131 1297 
N6 1441 1778 1577 1478 1402 1456 
N7 926 912 1010 1196 917 810 
N8 2859 2499 2222 2734 2041 1835 
N9 1133 1374 1789 1350 1939 807 
N10 1031 1184 1191 1284 1101 818 
N11 1875 2396 2175 2222 2022 1699 
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Appendix 12: Each subject's endorsement rates for each type of adjective in 
Experiment 3. 
Appendix 12-1 
The endorsement rates for Negative adjectives in Experiment 3. 
negative 
500 ms 
positive neutral negative 
2000 ms 
positive neutral 
1 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.50 0.50 0.13 
2 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13 
3 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.38 0.13 0.13 
5 0.38 0.13 0.38 0.25 0.13 0.25 
6 0.50 0.38 0.75 0.63 0.88 0.38 
7 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.13 
8 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.13 
9 0.50 0.88 0.88 0.50 0.88 0.75 
10 0.38 0.63 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.25 
11 0.38 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.25 0.25 
12 0.13 0.38 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 0.38 0.75 0.50 0.63 0.50 0.63 
14 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.38 
15 0.38 0.13 0.50 0.38 0.13 0.13 
16 0.63 0.50 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.63 
17 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.38 
18 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.13 0.00 
19 0.63 0.38 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 
20 0.13 0.50 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.13 
21 0.38 0.13 0.50 0.25 0.13 0.50 
22 0.25 0.63 0.38 0.38 0.75 0.00 
23 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.13 
24 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
25 0.38 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.38 0.25 
26 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 
27 0.63 0.25 0.38 0.63 0.25 0.50 
28 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.63 
29 0.13 0.13 0.50 0.38 0.13 0.25 
30 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
31 0.38 0.50 0.25 0.38 0.38 0.38 
32 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.38 0.00 0.25 
33 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.50 0.00 
34 0.38 0.38 0.13 0.63 0.00 0.38 
35 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.13 
36 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 
37 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.25 
38 0.13 0.63 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.25 
39 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.13 0.25 
40 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
41 0.50 0.38 0.63 0.88 0.50 0.50 
42 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.25 
43 0.63 0.00 0.13 0.75 0.00 0.00 
44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
45 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.50 
46 0.13 0.38 0.50 0.25 0.13 0.13 
47 0.38 0.63 0.13 0.63 0.25 0.13 
48 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.13 
49 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.13 
50 0.38 0.75 0.63 0.88 0.50 0.88 
51 0.75 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.38 
52 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.13 0.13 
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Appendix 12-2 
The endorsement rates for Positive adjectives in Experiment 3. 
500 ms 2000 ms 
negative positive neutral negative positive neutral 
1 0.88 0.88 0.63 0.63 0.88 0.88 
2 0.38 0.50 0.38 0.13 0.38 0.25 
3 0.63 1.00 0.75 0.88 1.00 1.00 
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
5 0.63 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.75 0.88 
6 0.88 0.88 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.88 
7 0.50 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.25 0.50 
8 0.88 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 
9 0.63 0.88 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.75 
10 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.88 0.63 0.88 
11 0.75 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.88 0.88 
12 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 
13 0.38 0.88 0.63 0.75 0.25 0.75 
14 0.63 0.88 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 
15 0.88 1.00 0.88 0.63 1.00 1.00 
16 0.38 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.13 0.63 
17 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 r.oo 1.00 
18 0.25 0.63 0.00 0.13 0.75 0.00 
19 0.50 0.88 0.75 0.38 0.63 1.00 
20 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.63 
21 0.63 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.88 1.00 
22 0.88 0.88 0.63 1.00 0.63 1.00 
23 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.63 0.88 0.88 
24 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.88 1.00 1.00 
25 0.50 0.88 0.63 0.38 0.75 0.63 
26 0.38 0.88 0.63 0.13 0.38 0.63 
27 0.38 0.63 0.63 0.50 0.75 0.88 
28 0.88 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.88 
29 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.88 
30 0.75 0.63 0.38 0.63 0.63 0.63 
31 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 
32 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.88 
33 LOG 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.88 
34 0.63 1.00 0.75 0.38 0.75 1.00 
35 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.75 1.00 
36 0.63 0.75 0.75 0.88 0.63 0.75 
37 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.00 
38 0.88 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.88 0.88 
39 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.88 
40 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 1.00 
41 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.88 
42 0.88 0.75 0.63 0.88 0.75 0.88 
43 0.13 0.75 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.00 
44 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 
45 0.50 0.75 0.63 0.63 0.88 0.88 
46 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.88 
47 0.38 0.63 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.75 
48 0.88 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.00 
49 1.00 0.75 0.75 0.38 0.75 0.75 
50 0.38 0.63 0.50 0.63 0.63 0.63 
51 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.63 0.88 0.88 
52 0.50 1.00 0.88 0.63 0.88 1.00 
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Appendix 13: Each subject's mean reaction times for each type of adjective in 
Experiment 3. 
Appendix 13-1 
negative 
500 ms 
positive neutral negative 
2000 ms 
positive neutral 
1 958 1278 863 1211 928 772 
2 1044 852 641 821 723 356 
3 1101 1069 885 940 1134 900 
4 1155 1375 1166 1186 1345 1716 
5 2107 1577 1731 1970 1536 2278 
6 1269 2720 2226 4038 1719 2011 
7 1685 1336 1643 1672 1805 1543 
8 938 1104 1022 1044 1061 982 
9 958 950 979 983 1141 912 
10 949 875 840 941 781 850 
11 1007 1074 725 956 826 966 
12 2109 1319 2060 2868 2432 1691 
13 967 1269 886 1097 1027 755 
14 622 719 685 743 794 720 
15 1563 1581 1385 1558 1138 1587 
16 1913 2317 2047 1779 2247 2074 
17 1452 1208 1260 1373 1351 1390 
18 1056 893 1013 864 855 851 
19 1860 1173 1187 2592 2830 1288 
20 2455 1695 1320 1810 2106 1168 
21 1330 1226 1156 1841 1520 1266 
22 1333 1433 1280 1326 1505 1201 
23 1218 1052 920 867 1240 1330 
24 1372 1037 1301 1563 1279 1243 
25 .968 1042 1017 1030 1023 1051 
26 1479 1163 1048 1001 952 1023 
27 917 934 770 666 756 841 
28 866 879 1125 900 975 967 
29 1094 1313 1171 1133 1520 1004 
30 737 949 853 760 760 772 
31 697 721 677 710 731 777 
32 737 687 664 754 753 693 
33 1315 1032 1134 1194 1359 1284 
34 849 1272 866 1121 873 905 
35 1258 907 959 1233 726 841 
36 1492 1503 1568 1400 1283 1415 
37 1754 1223 1448 901 943 1397 
38 1409 1583 1457 1408 1458 1365 
39 2203 2460 2292 1858 1544 2078 
40 699 732 711 755 702 786 
41 2291 3118 2259 2091 2651 1891 
42 1118 1422 1529 1177 1186 1600 
43 1745 1210 954 1688 1435 . 813 
44 888. 1112 1068 963 1033 1063 
45 2119 1779 2825 2178 2286 2053 
46 1785 1594 1550 1493 1343 1348 
47 706 1034 808 776 800 782 
48 833 791 819 852 889 986 
49 1131 1415 1314 1302 1126 1106 
50 1765 2041 1551 1064 1626 1287 
51 1541 1277 1600 1574 1185 1271 
52 1220 994 1178 1171 1006 1071 
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Appendix 13-2 
The mean reaction times for Positive adjectives in Experiment 3. 
500 ms 2000 ms 
negative positive neutral negative positive neutral 
1 1177 851 815 928 694 828 
2 927 773 589 821 851 645 
3 1182 1049 1251 1016 1235 1097 
4 1599 1081 996 1319 1456 2001 
5 1690 1011 1559 1823 1216 996 
6 1233 1509 1062 3850 1550 972 
7 1291 1395 1673 1491 1420 1201 
8 998 743 1020 1179 1070 1221 
9 869 705 990 1099 845 964 
10 960 961 828 957 892 815 
11 978 1002 936 854 790 1183 
12 1916 2012 1599 2845 2373 2105 
13 1676 1139 1088 1380 824 1140 
14 593 498 601 600 501 575 
15 1379 1093 1073 948 1162 1564 
16 1990 1443 2005 1805 2652 1714 
17 1205 1339 1190 1590 1258 1146 
18 1121 811 1049 749 915 815 
19 2141 1737 1519 2340 1539 1064 
20 1535 1082 2079 1312 1464 1132 
21 1389 1103 1338 1298 1354 1556 
22 1128 969 1310 1138 1300 1038 
23 1078 1047 1176 837 1113 883 
24 1220 748 871 973 786 850 
25 1032 956 983 1032 865 1094 
26 888 714- 836 843 651 1179 
27 827 761 690 746 671 805 
28 777 853 858 899 784 747 
29 1229 1030 1347 1546 1328 1050 
30 804 887 877 749 779 723 
31 603 617 645 630 600 679 
32 631 649 701 668 647 498 
33 933 1269 1103 1288 1539 1058 
34 854 883 812 1061 1056 801 
35 1079 1152 967 1265 1141 723 
36 1646 1410 1113 1172 1204 1214 
37 1138 1352 1329 1720 1052 848 
38 1435 1216 1190 1156 1329 1162 
39 2565 2351 2415 1925 1647 1403 
40 622 614 565 711 762 675 
41 3028 2038 2134 2281 1934 2237 
42 1213 1424 1347 1520 1224 1150 
43 1534 1283 806 1547 1839 1026 
44 936 811 911 920 934 949 
45 1837 1391 1641 1767 1563 1340 
46 1440 1279 1494 1754 1564 1237 
47 597 752 869 778 987 719 
48 970 897 716 927 756 814 
49 1045 1139 1001 1434 1568 952 
50 1962 1430 1010 1758 1837 1241 
51 1384 933 1127 1257 970 826 
52 1184 842 751 1184 847 776 
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